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ABSTRACT 
 The Monterey Security Architecture (MYSEA) supports a multilevel secure 
(MLS) network and a number of single level networks at different classification 
levels.  The MYSEA MLS server is the focus of policy enforcement.  It 
implements a Dynamic Security Services mechanism (DSS) that can modulate 
IPSec security attributes and MYSEA security services based upon administrator 
choices. Use of intrusion detection technology on the unprotected single level 
networks can provide administrators with actionable information to inform DSS 
choices. 
 The objective of this thesis is to design an intrusion detection system (IDS) 
architecture that permits administrators operating on MYSEA client machines to 
conveniently view and analyze IDS alerts from the single level networks. 
 A progressive set of analyses and experiments was conducted that led to 
a working implementation of an IDS for MYSEA. Sensors are located on the 
single level networks. Their alerts are fed into the MLS server, where single level 
databases are used to store and organize the data. Administrators can login from 
the MLS LAN and examine IDS results, which may be used to derive new DSS 
policies. A testing methodology was developed and functional tests were 
performed.  Implementation considerations for future extensions of this work are 
presented. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. MOTIVATION 
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) are an important component of a 
comprehensive defense in depth approach for securing information system 
networks by looking for malicious activity on the network. The function of the IDS 
is to watch and assess network activity without affecting that traffic. Data 
collected by the IDS is sent to a database for further analysis by skilled security 
analysts and system administrators. These analysts often use tools that can 
parse the captured data into meaningful human readable formats. IDS can really 
be viewed as a collection of three main software components, a sensor that 
resides on a network segment assessing traffic, a database for storing the results 
of traffic assessments in the form of alert data sent by the IDS, and an analysis 
tool for examining the collected data.  
Deployment of IDS sensors in a network at a single classification level is 
straightforward. To monitor inbound and outbound network traffic sensors are 
placed at the demarcation points of the enclave. Data sent from the IDS sensors 
to a central repository for analysis provide analysts the capability to determine 
the criticality of this data and take appropriate actions.  Department of Defense 
(DoD) networks have different classification levels, for example the NIPRNet 
(Unclassified) and SIPRNet (Secret) are military networks that are separated by 
a guard or physically separated. Data generated by an IDS on the NIPRNet 
cannot be stored with data generated by an IDS on the SIPRNet since in both 
cases the IDS data came from a sensor that carries the same classification level 
as the network it monitored. This separation of data presents a problem when 
analysts need to perform correlation analysis on alerts. With data separated by 
classification level an analyst is really only working with a sub-set of data. 
Combining the data would provide the analyst will a full set of data to work with, 
which would give comprehensive results from analysis performed on the data. 
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The Monterey Security Architecture (MYSEA) is an experimental multilevel 
secure computing environment that can provide a common end-point between 
networks of different classification levels [1]. In the MYSEA environment, a 
multilevel secure operating system installed on an Intel hardware platform 
provides isolation by enforcing Mandatory Access Control (MAC) policies.  This 
platform is the MYSEA server. A MYSEA server also acts as a redistribution 
point for clients inside the MYSEA network that need to access resources such 
as web and email.  
Collecting and storing data sent by the IDS from the multiple networks at 
different classification levels presents a unique challenge. Some of the data 
contains the payload of the packet that triggered the alert. By default, the 
classification of the alert is the same as the classification of the network from 
which the alert was generated. Despite this challenge, there is also a unique 
opportunity to have all of the alert notifications from networks at different 
classification levels fused as actionable information. A unique component of the 
MYSEA environment is its Dynamic Security Services (DSS), which can provide 
a Quality of Security Service (QoSS) [2]. In particular, the current implementation 
allows IPSec security associations [2] to be modulated based upon session 
attributes and network conditions. The motivation behind a QoSS was to raise 
the security level based on perceived network threats, but there must be a way to 
identify these threats. Using an IDS and storing alerts for analysis will provide a 
means to identify attacks that can threaten the network and if the attacks warrant 
a change in IPSec security requirements the analyst can inform the administrator 
for the DSS. 
B. PURPOSE OF STUDY 
The objective of this thesis is to study the best method for deploying an 
Intrusion Detection System and setting up a central repository for alerts in a MLS 
architecture. A secondary objective is to provide a method for the DSS  
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administrator to view attacks to determine if switching to a different Dynamic 
Security Services (DSS) security policy is warranted. This thesis examines the 
following questions. 
1. In the MYSEA environment, what is the best way to locate and 
configure IDS sensors and a central repository to collect and store sensor data to 
afford the system analysts with a complete picture? 
2. If data cannot be stored in one central database due to unforeseen 
complications what are reasonable alternatives?  
The IDS field is very active with many feasible products ranging from open 
source products to high-end innovative commercial products. To provide an 
organizational framework, the following methodology is used in this research 
effort. Background material will be established by conducting a review of existing 
products and researching previous work in the field of intrusion detection. 
General requirements coupled with selection criteria will be applied to a formal 
selection process to cull IDS components appropriate for the prospective 
architecture.  A new architecture will be developed based on the current MYSEA 
architecture for integrating the new IDS components that addresses security 
issues concerned with moving data at different classifications in a MLS 
environment. Proving the concepts will first take place by conducting experiments 
on Linux systems that are similar to the XTS400 system [3]. These experiments, 
if successful, will lead to the development of a functional prototype that can be 
employed in the MYSEA architecture. To verify that the integration of the IDS 
components functions correctly in the MYSEA environment, testing 
methodologies will be developed to exercise individual components as well as to 
exercise the entire suite as one functional unit. The results from this research 
project will then be used to analyze the utility of the IDS components for 
presenting a picture of what is happening on the network with respect to possible 
attacks and how this data can be used to inform decision makers. . 
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C. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
Organization of this thesis is as follows:  
Chapter I provides the motivation and purpose of this thesis, and 
introduces the problem of implementing an IDS in a multilevel security 
environment 
Chapter II provides detailed background information on different 
components of an Intrusion Detection Systems with a more in depth review of 
Snort.  Other topics covered include the MYSEA network, analysis tools used to 
analyze captured data such as the Basic Analysis Security Engine (BASE). 
Chapter III covers the selection process for choosing an IDS, database 
and analysis tool that will be implemented in the MYSEA architecture. 
Chapter IV covers the concept of operations and design of the entire IDS 
system from sensors to its analysis tool. 
Chapter V describes the implementation of the actual components on both 
Red Hat 8 Linux system and a XTS 400 system running the STOP 6.3 OS. The 
chapter concludes with the test plan and testing results for both environments 
Chapter VI consummates the thesis with conclusions and future work.  
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II. BACKGROUND 
This chapter contains background information on the Monterey Security 
Architecture (MYSEA), Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), analysis tools used in 
examining IDS data, and a proxy service for the open source database MySQL. 
A.  MYSEA ENVIRONMENT OVERVIEW 
The Department of Defense (DoD) maintains physical separation between 
networks of different classification levels. For example, there are the unclassified 
NIPRNet and the secret SIPRNet. For both networks to exist in the same 
enclave, each network must be built as a physically separated infrastructure, 
therefore doubling equipment such as workstations, servers, routers, etc. The 
Monterey Security Architecture (MYSEA) supports a common infrastructure for 
security classification levels on a single network by using high assurance 
components that enforce mandatory security policies [1]. This multilevel secure 
network environment consists of both high-assurance components such as the 
XTS-400 server running a secure operating system and low-assurance 
commercial components.  A trusted communications path is setup between these 
components using the Trusted Path Extension (TPE) module. The TPE provides 
a trusted path between users who are computing on common COTS operating 
systems and MYSEA high assurance server. It should be noted that the TPE is 
part of the distributed Trusted Computer Base (TCB) along with the MYSEA 
server. All internal network traffic in the MYSEA environment uses IPSec[1]. 
Dynamic Security Services (DSS) provide a method for adjusting Security 
Associations (SAs) for confidentiality and integrity managed by IPSec [2]. This 
architecture also supports multiple external networks that are at different 
classification levels. 
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Figure 1: MYSEA Environment 
 
1. XTS-400 and STOP Operating System 
The keystone of the MYSEA environment is the XTS-400 platform running 
the Secure Trusted Operating System (STOP) developed by BAE Systems. This 
operating system can enforce Mandatory Access Control policies (MAC) to 
enforce confidentiality and integrity. The MAC policies are based on the Bell and 
LaPadula model [3] for confidentiality and Biba model [3] for integrity. 
Enforcement of these policies on a single system allows for simultaneous 
processing and storage of data at different classification levels by users with 
different clearances [3].  
To protect the security kernel, the STOP uses a method known as 
“domains of isolation” [3] with the security kernel being at domain 0, the most 
protected domain. Note that in most descriptions of such systems, these are 
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known as privilege domains. Processes are restricted by domains and can only 
communicate with domains of equal or lesser privileges. There are four domain 
levels, 0 through 3. Level 0 is for the Security Kernel, level 1 for Trusted System 
Services, level 2 for Operating System Services and level 3 for Application 
Programs. Figure 2 shows a diagram of how the domains interact with each 
other.  
 
Figure 2: STOP Four-Domain Architecture [3] 
 
2.  Dynamic Security Services (DSS) 
The Dynamic Security Services provide a method to balance protection for 
communications in the MYSEA environment to meet external conditions. A 
dynamic service allows the IPSec policy to be changed based on the state of the 
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operating environment while preserving finite resources for the computer system 
[2]. Currently to change the System Security Level and System Operation Mode, 
IPSec policies on the DSS requires manual intervention. The adjustment of these 
IPSec policies stems from John Horn's work with Dynamic Security Services [2]. 
Communication channels may service connection requests at different 
classification levels using an appropriate cryptographic algorithm such as MD5, 
SHA1, DES, and so on, in order to balance CPU load with the required level of 
classification [2]. For example, if System Security Level is set to Low and System 
Operational Mode is set to Normal then the AH policy would be set to use the 
MD5 algorithm and the ESP policy set to use the DES algorithm. Escalating 
either System Security Level or System Operational Mode would increase the 
algorithm used by AH or ESP, or both. Ideally, it is more efficient to notify the 
MYSEA server of changing conditions using an automated process. Prior work 
by John Horn leaves this problem as future work [2]. There is also no method in 
the MYSEA framework to monitor for the occurrence of network attacks. The 
operator or the DSS needs to have an indicator to forecast network conditions. 
An IDS can be tied in with the DSS to serve as that indicator. 
3. External Networks 
Depending on the physical location of a MLS environment, it may have to 
communicate with single level networks at various classification levels. Figure 1 
shows the MYSEA MLS enclave networked with the unclassified NIPRNET, 
secret SIPRNET, and another arbitrary network, COALITION. One of the 
functions of the NIPRNET is to handle normal Internet traffic for users in the MLS 
LAN. Therefore, this network also poses the greatest risk with respect to 
malicious traffic.  
Interconnection of two networks at two differing classifications levels is 
handled by the MYSEA server by enforcing MAC policies. Even though two 
networks of different classifications levels terminate at the same physical server,  
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the MLS server is capable of keeping network stacks at different classification 
levels logically separated with high assurance, thus eliminating the use of a 
guard or requiring physical separation. 
4. Trusted Path Extension 
The Trusted Path Extension (TPE) is a logical extension of the MYSEA 
server. It is a small device attached to the client that provides a secure, non-
forgeable connection between the Trusted Computing Base (TCB) of the MYSEA 
server and the user (see Figure 1). The TPE provides for user authentication and 
establishing users’ session classification level [1]. 
5. MLS HTTP Proxy Service 
The MYSEA server has a HTTP Proxy service that handles clients 
requesting web pages of varying classification levels. A proxy server services the 
requests of its clients by forwarding requests to other servers. On the MYSEA 
MLS server, the HTTP proxy service handles all web requests from its clients. To 
save time in writing a trusted application this project will take advantage of this 
HTTP proxy service by using a web-based intrusion analysis tool. Thus, analysts 
can log in on any workstation connected to a TPE and gain access to the IDS 
analysis web site. 
B.  INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEMS (IDS) 
This section describes how an IDS functions and why they are used to 
defend networks.  There are several open source and commercial off the shelf 
IDS products available. Chapter III will cover the criteria for choosing an IDS for 
this project. 
1. Overview of an IDS 
An Intrusion Detection System acts like a sentinel with the ability to look 
for activity that resembles reconnaissance, attempted system compromise, or 
 10
other malicious activity [4]. An IDS’s job is to inspect the contents of network 
traffic for possible attacks.  IDSes are capable of parsing through network traffic 
and comparing that traffic to known attack signatures. When IDSes discover an 
attack, they can raise an alarm by sending out alerts.   
In 1980, James P. Anderson described the notion of IDS in his paper 
Computer Security Threat Monitoring and Surveillance [6]. The idea was to build 
a better security audit tool designed more for the security administrator. Dr. 
Dorothy Denning’s paper published in 1987, An Intrusion-Detection Model, 
served as the first blueprint for designing an IDS [7]. Her model addresses a wide 
range of threats from outside attackers to abuses by insiders. 
IDS architectures consist of three different components, the sensors, 
repositories, and analysis tools. A preferred architecture has each component 
installed on separate hardware platforms connected by a high speed LAN, but 
installation of all components on one platform is acceptable provided the 
hardware resources can handle the load. Figure 3 shows a typical IDS 
architecture. 
 
Figure 3: Generic Network IDS Placement 
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Effective monitoring of network traffic relies on sensor location.  Sensors 
are placed at strategic network locations that will allow it to see as much network 
traffic as possible on that network segment. Sensors could be located in front of 
firewalls, behind them, or on a special zone known as a Demilitarized Zone 
(DMZ). A sensor placed in front of a firewall will see all of the network traffic on 
that segment; however, the amount of network traffic could overwhelm the 
sensor. Sensors behind a firewall or on a DMZ monitor filtered traffic that the 
firewall allowed. Sensors ‘sniff’ network traffic by capturing all network traffic 
through the use of a Network Interface Card (NIC) set in promiscuous mode.  
Normally a NIC operates in non-promiscuous mode and only forwards 
traffic up the stack if it is destined for the platform’s media access control (MAC) 
address or it is a broadcast.  This method cuts down on the amount of traffic 
processed by the operating system. When operating in promiscuous mode, the 
host will forward all traffic up the TCP stack. IDS sensors utilize this feature to 
analyze all traffic that can be seen on the network segment to which they are 
attached. A promiscuous NIC does not even require an IP address and usually 
does not have one. This technique provides additional security for the sensor. 
Communications between sensors and repositories takes place over a separate 
maintenance network. 
Analysis of network packets consists of one of two methods. The first 
method identifies known attacks by looking for a distinct signature. Signatures 
are unique lines of machine code or strings found in the payload of network 
packets. For example, a common method to inject shell code uses repeated 
occurrences of 0x90 in the payload, which is machine code for a NOP (short for 
perform no operation). The use of numerous 0x90 in this example indicates a 
signature known as a "nop slide". The other method of attack detection is 
anomaly detection, which relies on complex statistics to build a set of rules. 
These rules are used similar to signature rules since they form the basis for 
generating alerts when possible attacks are detected. Analysts first create a 
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baseline of the network to determine acceptable normal behavior. Any network 
activity that falls outside of this acceptable behavior is flagged as an alert.  
Neither of these methods is perfect, and they will create false positives 
and false negatives. With respect to IDS, a false positive occurs when the IDS 
signals that there is an attack when, in fact, no attack has taken place. This can 
result from the use of poorly designed rules or from bad statistical measurements 
of the network. There is another category of false positives that result when the 
IDS detects a true attack but none of the systems in the network are vulnerable 
to this attack. False positives raise unnecessary alarms that detract from the 
purpose of using IDS. False positives can be managed by using well-written rules 
and removing obsolete rules. On the other hand, false negatives occur when the 
IDS misses events. Reasons for missing events can vary, from hackers using 
evasion techniques, network packet loss on a busy network, or using improper 
rules. Since false negatives equate to not seeing attacks, this creates a situation 
that is not desirable. The only real counter measure to managing false negatives 
is to follow all published best practices when deploying sensors. 
A default configuration for IDS sensors results in the storage of alerts in a 
file using some kind of unified log format. Log files could potentially hold 
thousands, even millions of pieces of information.  An analyst would be 
overwhelmed trying to make sense of such log files. To overcome this problem, 
sensor configurations allow for output software plug-ins that can send alerts and 
logs to a repository. A central repository provides a place to keep alerts and logs 
collected from all sensors. Collecting all the alerts at one location gives the 
security analyst a complete picture of what is happening on the network. These 
repositories are common relational database products such as MySQL, Microsoft 
MSSQL and PostGreSQL. Using a relational database is more advantageous 
than using log files since database products come with a wide assortment of 
management tools such as automated backups and replication to other 
databases. 
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Analysis tools provide a picture of what is happening on the network. 
Some IDS products come with their own proprietary tools, whereas open source 
IDS have numerous add-on tools to choose from. The basic function of these 
tools is to pull information from relational databases and compile it into 
meaningful statistics, correlation information, charts, and graphs, therefore 
making it easier for security analysts to make decisions about possible attacks.  
2.  Snort 
Presently there are several open source and commercial-off-the-shelf 
Intrusion Detection System applications.  Over the last nine years, the market 
has expanded and many of the industry leaders such as Cisco, McAfee, 
Symantec, Juniper Networks, etc. have rolled out either an IDS or the next 
generation Intrusion Prevention System (IPS).  An IPS has the same capabilities 
as IDS, but with the added ability to block the incoming attacks that it detects. [9]. 
An IPS is normally placed in line with the flow of traffic, which means all traffic 
physically flows through the IPS. The IDS can only passively monitor traffic flows, 
traffic does not flow into an IDS and back out to its destination. Snort’s first 
release was December 22, 1998 by Marty Roesch, as a packet sniffer tool [4]. 
Snort began using signature-based analysis in January 1999 [4]. Today Snort is 
the leading open source IDS and enjoys large community support. Most of the 
support comes from Roesch’s security company Sourcefire. 
Snort’s architecture is composed of four basic components: 
• A network packet sniffer 
• The preprocessor 
• The detection engine 
• Output plug-ins (alert file, log file, database) 
A packet sniffer captures all of the network traffic off the wire. Snort’s 
packet sniffer uses the libpcap library, a freely distributed library used for 
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grabbing packets off a network. Most Linux systems come with libpcap installed. 
The Windows operating systems use winpcap with Snort.  
Packets grabbed off the wire are just raw packets, so the job of the 
preprocessor is to perform sorting and checking to facilitate efficient analysis. 
Snort's engine uses compiled code called preprocessors to normalize traffic and 
examine the traffic for possible attacks or abnormal behavior. The first plug-in for 
example is a protocol decoder. Decoding of all network traffic must take place 
before passing it on to the other preprocessors and the detection engine. Other 
plug-ins handle IP defragmentation, stateful inspection and application layer 
protocols. The ability of preprocessors to find attacks or abnormal behavior saves 
further processing time and valuable system resources. Creating new 
preprocessors or extending existing preprocessors requires C programming skill 
but documentation is available if either task is required. 
After data leaves the preprocessor, it is handed off to the detection 
engine. Snort is primarily a rules-based IDS. The detection engine runs the data 
through a set of rules that look for distinct signatures. Data packets that match a 
rule will trigger the alert pre-processor. Signature rules are categorized into 
groups such as those that can identify Trojan horses, buffer overflows and other 
application vulnerabilities. Rules have their own syntax so administrators must be 
careful when writing additional rules. One syntax error in any rule will prevent the 
Snort process from starting. Currently there is no alert process in place to verify 
that Snort initialized properly. It is up to the administrator to check the systems' 
log files to verify Snort initialization. If a rule prevented Snort from starting, the log 
file will state which rule failed. Sourcefire normally releases new rules, which 
have been tested and certified to work correctly, however anyone can design 
new, customized rules. 
By default, Snort writes its alerts to an alert file on the sensor. Alert and 
logging output are easily configured using Snort’s configuration file. Some of the 
most common output methods are to send alerts to a syslog process or to a 
relational database such as MySQL or Windows MSSQL server. There are quite 
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a few other ways to output alerts and security administrators may program their 
own output methods such as sending alerts to non-supported databases or file 
formats. 
C. IDS ANALYSIS TOOLS 
This section will cover IDS analysis tools. These tools play an important 
role in helping analysts make sense of of the alert data gathered from various 
IDS sensors. 
1. Overview of IDS Analysis Tools 
An IDS sensor could collect thousands, even millions of alerts depending 
on the sensor’s location on the network. An interview was conducted on 
November 14th, 2007, with two security personnel who work in the NPS 
Information Technology and Communication Services (ITACS) center. The 
objective was to ascertain how many alerts a production IDS sensor could 
accumulate. An interviewee explained that the IDS database held over two 
million alerts collected from just two sensors over a period of three months. Most 
of the alerts were not malicious in nature or had reasonable explanations, but the 
job of the analyst is to sift through these alerts looking for real attacks. This 
illustrates why it is imperative to use some type of analysis tool to parse through 
the voluminous Snort alert logs.  Imagine trying to read an alert file with two 
million entries. For ITACS, the analysis tool chosen is an open source application 
called BASE, (Basic Analysis and Security Engine). 
There are four important functions of IDS data analysis tools: 
• Real-time alerting 
• Attack Detection and Verification 
• Incident Analysis 
• Reporting 
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Real-time alerting requires setting up tools designed to monitor log files for 
specific patterns. In real-time alerting, the alert stream is examined for events 
based on certain combinations that express increasingly complex situations [4]. 
Implementing these tools is beyond the scope of this project. The remaining 
three factors take place offline on collected data. 
Attack detection and verification is the process of separating false 
positives from useful data. An IDS is not perfect because it either relies on rules 
for known attacks or statistical data for anomalous attacks. Finding an attack 
does not mean that is was successful, but the analyst should start an incident 
analysis process. The process consists of determining when the attack occurred, 
what the attack did, what systems were compromised and how was the attack  
performed, i.e., what method was used, such as shell code injection, buffer 
overflow, etc. Reporting on the incident gives decision makers an idea of the 
impact on the systems that were compromised. Regular reporting also gives the 
analyst repeated measurements over time to help fine tune the IDS by tracking 
changes to the data. 
2. Basic Security Analysis Engine (BASE) 
BASE is one of the leading open source web-based applications used to 
analyze IDS data. Written in PHP, BASE works in conjunction with the Apache 
web server and the MySQL relational database [5]. It provides some excellent 
features to assist with the task of working with a large amount of Snort alerts. A 
graphical interface provides database searching and sorting of alerts by 
protocols, time of day, unique alerts, and other miscellaneous queries. BASE can 
display network stack Layer 3 (network) and Layer 4 (transport) packet 
information. Graphs and charts provide for the viewing of statistics based on 
specified parameters. 
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D. MYSQL PROXY SERVICE 
This section covers a new program released from MySQL, an open source 
database company. To enhance functionality for database and application 
developers, MySQL designed a proxy service that works with MySQL clients and 
databases. 
1. Overview 
Proxy services are processes that service the requests of clients, by 
forwarding requests to other servers. By acting as an intermediary, all service 
requests appear to come from a single source. There are several types of 
proxies, but this project is using a new database proxy developed by MySQL. 
2. MySQL Proxy Service 
The MySQL proxy service is situated between one or more MySQL clients 
and a MySQL database server. Clients connect to the proxy using their regular 
credentials, instead of connecting directly to the server. This proxy acts the same 
as any other proxy process but with additional capabilities. Attached to the proxy 
service is a Lua interpreter. Lua is an interpretive scripting language, with an 
interpreter written in clean C, i.e., a common subset of ANSI C and C++.  [10]. 
Using Lua scripts allows for flexibility in manipulating SQL queries before they 
reach the SQL server. Some of the new capabilities include injecting new data 
into a query, filtering, and even rewriting the query [8]. 
E. EMERALD 
This section reviews EMEARALD, an intrusion detection and response 
project developed by SRI International [24]. 
 18
1. Overview 
Event Monitoring Enabling Responses to Anomalous Live Disturbances 
(EMERALD) is an advanced IDS project intended to provide IDS for distributed 
networks. The conceptual design is for a scalable surveillance and response 
architecture for large dispersed networks [24]. The design employs numerous 
monitors at various abstract layers in the network. The main advantage to 
EMERALD's architecture is the ability to detect not just local attacks, but also 
coordinated attacks such as distributed denial of service attacks or repeated 
patterns of attack against multiple domains [24]. Figure 4 shows the initial design 
of the EMERALD monitor architecture. 
 
Figure 4: EMERALD Architecture [24] 
 
A major strength of the EMERALD project is the design of components 
that cover the main areas of event detection and response such as signature 
detection, anomaly detection, and a correlation reporting method. EMERALD 
eBayes component performs anomaly detection  through the use of probabilistic 
models of normal, attack, and anomalous behavior, and serves as the profile 
engine (see Figure 4) [25]. EMERALD eXpert is a highly targetable signature-
analysis engine based on the expert system shell P-BEST [25]. This component 
serves as the signature engine (see Figure 4) to detect known malicious attacks. 
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The correlation component, Assessing Strategic Intrusions Using CIDF (ASIC), 
uses an analysis method developed by SRI and ISI/USC to correlate intrusion 
reports, discern large-scale patterns of attack, and infer the intent of the 
adversary [25]. The independent sensors use a standardized communication 
format, Common Intrusion Detection Framework (CIDF), as a means to 
communicate information amongst other sensors. If one sensor is under attack, it 
can communicate information about the attack to other sensors. 
F. SUMMARY 
Defense in depth for a unique environment like the MYSEA MLS network 
requires implementation of an IDS. The challenges associated with such an 
implementation lie with consolidating alerts from sensors that are at different 
classification levels and using an analysis tool to parse through this alert data.  
The next chapter describes the selection criteria used to choose an IDS for this 
project.  
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III. CRITERIA FOR SELECTION OF IDS COMPONENTS 
To formalize a selection method for choosing an IDS system, it is best to 
view an IDS in terms of its three major components: a sensor that reads network 
traffic, a database for storing alerts and logs, and analysis tools. This chapter will 
use the following approach to select the required components. The General 
Requirements section will list a few broad requirements related to the scope of 
the project in order to provide a starting point for generating specific criteria 
required for each component. To help pare down the available choices the 
selection criteria lists, in ranking order, criteria specific to this project. The 
selection process will explain, based upon considerations of criteria, how 
products were eliminated. The justification for selecting a product will be 
explained in the final section. 
A. AVAILABLE IDS 
There are numerous IDS available for purchase from software companies 
or freely downloadable as open source products.. Using the popular Internet 
search engines, such as Google, to find IDS products yielded numerous results 
touting new products. To choose an appropriate IDS sensor for this project, the 
following steps were performed. 
1. General Requirements 
Before reading numerous reviews of IDS or establishing specific criteria, 
general requirements based on the environment were established. These are 
listed here. First, the project will require multiple IDS sensors to handle the 
various single level networks that feed into the MYSEA architecture. To simplify 
the project only one type of IDS will be selected, however, it is possible to use 
multiple types of sensors. Second, the IDS sensors will not host a database to 
store events but instead will forward events to another database system. Third, 
the goal of this project is to establish a generic template for any future IDS 
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products that would be used in the MYSEA architecture or any similar MLS 
environment. Fourth, the project has a limited budget and no time to deal with 
procurements. The procurement process would involve writing request for 
proposals (RFPs) and other such documents. Performing this level of work is 
beyond the scope of this project. Establishing these general requirements allows 
for the development of specific selection criteria. Each selection criteria, except 
for Open Source and Extensibility, will have a ranking system from 1 to 4, where 
1 is the lowest rank and 4 is the highest. All of the criteria are equally weighted 
and the two criteria, Open Source and Extensibility are either “Yes” or “No”, 
binary items. The ranking system gives quantifiable measures to subjective 
criteria. 
2. Selection Criteria 
• Open Source: The use of open source products saves time in 
dealing with proprietary software licenses, contracts and 
procurement processes. Open source products are freely 
distributed, operational products and can usually be downloaded in 
minutes.  The term “open source” actually covers a wide range of 
license agreements; the most common is the GNU General Public 
License (GPL) [11]. Only open source IDS products that come with 
an open source license will be considered for selection. This 
ranking is a binary ranking of either a “Yes”, or a “No”. 
• Platform compatibility: The IDS should be cross platform 
compatible with many Operating System platforms. As a minimum, 
the IDS should run on popular Linux and BSD distributions such as 
Debian, Fedora, and FreeBSD. 
a. Ranking Platform Compatibility 
 1. Supports minimal complement of common operating systems 
 2. Supports some common operating systems 
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 3. Supports many common operating systems 
 4. Supports most common operating systems 
• Usability: Some software programs can be difficult to set up and 
configure for its intended use. This criterion looks at items such as 
how is the IDS setup and configured, if there are Graphical User 
Interfaces (GUIs) or if operation requires using Command Line 
Interfaces (CLIs). 
b. Ranking Usability 
 1. Very difficult to setup and use, has CLI only 
 2. Moderately difficult to setup and use, has CLI only 
 3. Little difficulty in setup and use, has CLI only 
 4. Little to No difficulty in setup and use, has CLI and GUI  
 
• Product maturity:  One disadvantage to open source software is the 
body of work may not be fully functional or have too many bugs in 
it.  Software of this nature is often labeled as ‘alpha’ or ‘beta’ code. 
These designations are a software engineering reference to the 
level of testing the program has undergone. The selection process 
will take into account software version numbers to help determine 
product maturity or the years in use. The reason for the ‘OR’ 
statement is that not all version numbers truly reflect the maturity of 
the product. For example, Wireshark, formerly known as Ethereal, 
is currently at version 1.0, but has been in use for about 10 years 
and is one of the most popular network protocol analyzers used 
today. 
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c. Ranking Product Maturity 
 1. Product is in alpha code or in use less than 1 year 
 2. Product is in beta code or in use less than 2 years 
 3. Low versioning numbers (< 1.0) or in use less than 3 years  
 4. Versions above 1.0 or in use greater than 3 years 
• Support and documentation: Using good documentation aids in 
setting up a software program and using it correctly. Community 
forums and online documents are the main supply for getting 
support with open source products. Expert users of these programs 
set up web sites for others to share their experiences and 
knowledge. This selection criterion will factor in how much 
documentation is available, the quality of the documentation and if 
there are any tutorials that demonstrate how the product should 
work. 
d. Ranking Support and Documentation 
 1. Very little documentation, no user forums or tutorials 
2. Some documentation, has some user forums, no tutorials 
 3. Good documentation, has user forums, some tutorials 
4. Good to excellent documentation, active user forums, several 
clear tutorials 
• Extensibility: Having the source code allows the program to be 
modified or permits inclusion of new features to satisfy design 
requirements. It has not been determined at this point if 
modifications are required.  Thus, this is a good selection criterion 
but is not highly weighted. 
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3. SELECTION PROCESS 
Selecting an IDS can be reduced to only searching for open source 
products. A search of the Internet yielded some good sites that had information 
on IDS, but sites that were specific to the product were only used in research 
after reading reviews from non-biased sources such as www.linuxworld.com [12] 
and Infosecwriters.com [13]. From this research there are two leading open 
source IDS: Snort and Bro. Other open source products are used as Host-based 
Intrusion Detection Systems, which are not applicable to this project. Each 
product was set up in a small test environment to determine if they operated as 
an IDS. Elementary tests such as port scans and pre-generated network 
captures containing known exploits were used to determine usability. Each 
product's web site was reviewed to determine the other selection criteria [14], 
[15]. Table 1 summarizes the scoring for each system. 
 
Selection Criteria 
 Open 
source 
Platform 
Compatibility 
Usability Product 
Maturity
Support  & 
Documentation 
Extensibility
Snort  9   4  3  4  4  9  
Bro  9   3  2  4  3  9  
Table 1: Selection Criteria for IDS 
 
4. Selection Outcome 
Snort and Bro perform the same functions but they detect intrusions using 
different methods. Bro relies on detecting intrusions based on traffic 
characteristics and content, [16] while Snort relies on rules. Bro has the capability 
to use Snort’s rules set. Both products are excellent IDS, but for this project, 
Snort had higher scores in three of the selection criteria: platform compatibility, 
usability, and support documentation. Snort can be installed on most Linux 
operating systems, BSD and installed on Microsoft Windows. Bro ran well on 
BSD but had some compilation errors on a Linux Debian test system, and does 
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not support Windows. Both products were easy to setup but Snort was less 
complicated to configure and operate. Bro is not a solution for non-Unix 
environments and it was created with the intention that a UNIX expert would 
operate it [17].  Snort’s logging includes methods to send events to files or 
databases. Bro only supports sending events to a file. Other methods for storing 
alerts are left to the administrator. Both web sites had plenty of documentation, 
but Snort’s web site had more examples from the community than Bro’s web site 
[14], [15]. 
B. AVAILABLE DATABASES FOR STORING IDS SENSOR DATA 
The database is one of the most important components for an IDS 
installation since it will need to handle all of the transactions that take place when 
events, packets and alerts are logged. There are several open source relational 
databases available such as the popular databases from MySQL and PostGres. 
The general requirements section will list some broad requirements before 
detailed criteria are listed in the Selection Criteria section. . 
1. General Requirements 
The rate at which the database will need to log transactions has not been 
determined since stress testing is beyond the scope of this project. As a general 
requirement, the database should be able to handle moderate transaction loads. 
The first two selection criteria must be met. The remaining three criteria will use 
the same ranking system performed in the IDS selection process. 
2. Selection Criteria 
• Compatible with chosen IDS:  Currently Snort is capable of sending 
alerts to several different types of databases, including MySQL, 
PostgreSQL, Microsoft SQL Server, Oracle SQL server, and any 
Unix/Linux Open Database Connectivity (ODBC) compliant 
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database. Only ODBC compliant databases will be considered as 
this is either a “Yes” or “No” criterion. 
• Open source: To avoid license costs, only open source databases 
will be considered for the project. This is either a “Yes” or “No” 
criterion. 
• Platform compatibility:  The database application should support 
many of the popular operating systems. At a minimum, it should be 
compatible with the popular Linux operating systems such as 
Fedora and Debian. 
a. Ranking Platform Compatibility 
 1. Supports minimal complement of common operating systems 
 2. Supports some common operating systems 
 3. Supports many common operating systems 
4. Supports most common operating systems 
• Usability: Some databases come with only Command Line 
Interfaces (CLI), which mean all administration must be done using 
CLI commands. To assist with administration tasks, any GUI tools 
will enhance the product’s usability and make it a selection 
candidate. 
b. Ranking Usability 
 1. Very difficult to setup and use, has CLI only 
 2. Moderately difficult to setup and use, has CLI only 
 3. Little difficulty in setup and use, has CLI only 
 4. Little to No difficulty in setup and use, has CLI and GUI 
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• User support and documentation: Database setup and 
administration can be difficult; therefore, it is imperative that the 
product have good documentation and support. 
c. Ranking Support and Documentation 
 1. Very little documentation, no user forums or working examples 
2. Some documentation, has some user forums, no working 
examples 
 3. Good documentation, has user forums, some working examples 
4. Good to excellent documentation, active user forums, several 
clear examples 
3. Selection Process 
A search for open source databases reveals a plethora of choices. To 
narrow the selection down to a few candidates only the more widely known 
databases were considered.. Table 2 summarizes the selection criteria and uses 
information from a comparison that was performed on five open source 
databases [18]. 
Selection Criteria
 ODBC 
Compliant 
Open 
Source 
Platform 
Compatibility 
Usability Support & 
Documentation 
PostGreSQL  9   9   4  4  4 
MySQL  9   9   4  4  4 
MaxDB  9   9   4  3  4 
Firebird  9   9   4  3  4 
Ingres  9   9   4  3  4 
Table 2: Selection Criteria for Database 
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4. Selection Outcome 
The entire list of database products in Table 2 meets the general 
requirements and scored well in selection criteria, however MySQL and 
PostGreSQL are the two most popular databases used with Snort [4]. MySQL 
and PostgreSQL have also been used in past projects therefore; the element of 
familiarity gives MySQL and PostgreSQL higher scores in usability.  Preliminary 
design work identified a need to use a proxy client to move data from the sensor 
to the database. MySQL currently has a proxy client that is an alpha version [8], 
so this extra program may save time and effort with the project. The final choice 
was to use a MySQL database as the backend storage system. 
C. AVAILABLE ANALYSIS TOOLS 
Data analysis tools provide a GUI front end to the database that stores the 
numerous alerts. These tools compute and display statistical information that 
speeds up the process of sorting through all of the data. 
1. General Requirements 
Any analysis tool chosen must be able to parse through the Snort alerts. 
This general requirement narrows the selection of analysis tools down to Snort-
compliant tools. The first two selection criteria described below must be met; the 
remaining three criteria will be ranked similar to the other selection processes. 
2. Selection Criteria 
• Compatible with chosen database (MySQL) and IDS (Snort):  Due 
to Snort’s popularity, there are several analysis tools available to 
choose from. Some are open source and some are commercial 
products. Further selection criteria will narrow the list. 
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• Open source:  Only open source products will be considered for 
selection. Some commercial companies offer free licenses for their 
products, such as Aanvil [19], but these products are either limited 
or the code is not available. 
• Usability:  Analysis tools must provide some basic statistics, sorting 
and searching capabilities and must display detailed information 
about the packet. These requirements are necessary to rapidly 
process large amounts of information. 
a. Ranking Usability 
1. Provides little or no statistical or packet information, no sorting or 
searching capabilities 
2. Provides some statistical and packet information, has either 
sorting and searching but not both 
3. Provides statistical and packet information, has either sorting and 
searching capabilities, but not both 
4. Provides statistical and packet information, has both sorting and 
searching capabilities. 
• Uses a web interface (web site):  Using a web site product allows 
an analyst to access that product from any workstation that has a 
web browser. This is not a set criterion, any open source product 
that installs as a binary will be considered but website products are 
preferred.  
• Extensibility: To display new data in any additional database tables 
or modified tables may require rewriting some of the code. The 
programming language in which the product was written will be 
taken into consideration. Web site products written in popular  
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programming languages such as PHP or Perl will be considered 
over web site products that use difficult or obscure programming 
languages. 
3. Selection Process 
The selection for an analysis tool is bounded by three criteria, compatibility 
with MySQL, compatibility with Snort, and it must be open source. Snort 
documentation lists some open source products that are commonly used as 
analysis tools [4]. Table 3 lists four products that were examined as possible 
tools for this project. 
  Selection Criteria 
  Snort 
Compatibility 
MySQL 
Compatibility
Open 
Source
Usability Web‐
based 
Extensibility
BASE  9   9   9 4  Yes  9  
SGUIL  9   9   9 4  No  9  
SnortSnarf  9   9   9 2  Yes  9  
SnortALog  9   9   9 2  No  9  
Table 3: Selection Criteria for Analysis Tools 
 
4. Selection Outcome 
The most popular tool in the list is the Basic Analysis Security Engine 
(BASE) that has been an ongoing project for several years [20]. This product is 
web-based and written in PHP, a popular web scripting language. SGUIL 
(pronounced sgweel) is another popular product written in tcl/tk [21]. This product 
is not a web site product and requires communicating with an agent installed on 
the sensor. Due to the complexity and security considerations of the MYSEA 
architecture, it is currently not feasible to fit this product into the project. The 
remaining two products are written in Perl and do not provide any statistical 
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functionality, instead they are used to format and view logs in a more usable 
display. The choice for this project is to implement BASE as the analysis tool.   
D. SUMMARY 
Each component required to make a good IDS had suitable products that 
would work well, but those chosen had essential features that meet the 
preliminary project requirements. The next chapter will cover the concepts of 
operation, the formal requirements and design specifications, therefore 
illustrating how Snort, Mysql, and BASE, come together to make a complete 
working Intrusion Detection System suitable for the MYSEA architecture. 
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IV. REQUIREMENTS AND DESIGN 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will cover the concept of operations concerning how multiple 
IDSes could function in a Multilevel Security architecture using a single 
repository. An analysis of the MySQL protocol will be covered which is essential 
to understanding the complexity of the problem when dealing with network nodes 
that rely on a two-way communication protocol such as the MySQL protocol. The 
requirement section will define how the data from the sensors must be handled to 
satisfy MLS constraints. The design section will introduce a new architecture that 
differs from the concept of operations but easily fulfills the requirements section 
with only minor alterations. 
B. CONCEPT OF OPERATION 
1. Multiple IDSes using Single Repository 
Each Intrusion Detection Sensor monitors the traffic on the network to 
which it is attached and each network operates at a different classification level 
such as ‘unclassified’, ‘secret’, and so on. When the IDS sensor sends an alert, 
the data must be moved from a network at a particular classification level into a 
database operating at the highest level, i.e., System High (SH).  For example, if 
IDS1, on an unclassified network, sends an alert, the data is sent from an 
unclassified network to the MLS server’s unclassified port. At the MLS server, the 
packet is received by an untrusted process labeled U in Figure 5. The untrusted 
process labeled S in Figure 5 only receives traffic from an IDS attached to the 
secret network. The process labeled ML in Figure 5 is a trusted process, which 
can be configured with exemptions to receive data from processes at different 
classification levels. The database is set at SH, therefore, information flow from 
the network to the database is allowed since the classification setting of the 
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database is higher than the processes U and S. To view the data, an analyst can 
use any workstation attached to the MLS network such as the workstation 
depicted in Figure 5. Since everything is in a SH database the analyst must 
establish a session at SH before he can view any data. Figure 5 illustrates these 
concepts in a block diagram format. 
 
Figure 5: Concept of Operations 
 
The trusted kernel provides logical separation by isolating processes U 
and S and enforcing system-wide security policies. Processes U and S will act as 
a listening service (server) and as a sender (client). When the processes receive 
alerts, the alerts will be forwarded to the ML process. The Sys High process will 
receive the data from the ML process and forward the information to the 
database, which is set at SH. The physical placement of each component is 
illustrated in Figure 6. Each IDS will be placed behind a router with respect to 
traffic flow. In general, the placement of network components takes into account 
the inbound and outbound flow of traffic. To illustrate the placement of network 
components, consider the placement of a router and IDS sensor. If the sensor is 
placed on the network where it ‘sees’ the traffic before the router does, this 
 35
placement is in front of the router. If the router ‘sees’ the traffic before the sensor, 
then the placement of the sensor is behind the router. The importance of 
planning the placement of network components is to determine which component 
will act on the traffic first, the router or the sensor. Because Snort and most other 
IDSes cannot interpret encrypted data, placing sensors in front of the routers for 
the SIPRNET network or COALITION network would be impractical because they 
could not analyze this network traffic.   
The database server will serve two functions. One will be as a central 
repository for storing all alerts. The second function is to host the web application 
BASE, which will serve as the IDS analysis tool. The analyst will be able to 
access the BASE web site via an MLS HTTP proxy by establishing a session at 
the level SH on any COTS client on the MLS LAN. 
 
Figure 6: MYSEA Architecture with IDS 
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2.  MySQL Protocol Analysis 
The purpose of this analysis is to illustrate the two-way communication 
process that takes place between a Snort sensor and the MySQL database. 
Section 1 discussed abstract processes that dealt with moving data from a 
single-level sensor to a System High database. To keep the two-way 
communication process intact for the MYSEA architecture poses a unique 
challenge. With respect to information flow models, information can flow low to 
high, however information flow from high to low is an issue because there is a 
risk of sensitive information leakage. The analysis of the communication protocol 
between the MySQL database and sensor will give insight into the problem of 
database to client communications that move data from high to low. 
Snort’s alert processes utilize the MySQL client program that is installed 
on the sensor, to send alerts to a local MySQL database or across a Local Area 
Network (LAN) to a remote MySQL database. In either case, the MySQL client is 
responsible for establishing a connection with the MySQL database and acting 
as a database client for the Snort processes. 
The MySQL documentation cited in [23] describes the MySQL protocol but 
in order to verify how the protocol functions when used by Snort to send data to 
the MySQL database, a small test environment consisting of one sensor and one 
database was set up. To capture the exchange of traffic between database and 
sensor, the alerting mechanism on the sensor was triggered by performing a port 
scan on the sensor. The alert data sent by Snort and reciprocal response data 
sent by the MySQL database was captured and analyzed. The discussion that 
follows is a compilation of observations made during the experiment coupled with 
MySQL documentation. 
When the Snort process is initialized, a function calls the locally installed 
MySQL client to establish a connection with the database that is listed in the 
Snort configuration file: snort.conf. In response to this connection request, the 
database sends a ‘server greeting’ message containing attributes about the 
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MySQL server such as version number, server capabilities and server status. 
The MySQL client (on the sensor) responds to the greeting message with a login 
request, passing the credentials for a username that has already been configured 
in the Snort database resident on the MySQL server and stored in the Snort 
configuration file resident on the sensor. If the credentials are validated, the 
server responds with an OK message. 
After the MySQL client receives the OK message from the MySQL server 
in response to the authentication of credentials, Snort queries the database for 
an existing ‘sid’ (sensor identification) and ‘hostname’ to either establish a new 
identification if an old one does not exist, or to continue from the previously 
established session using the existing identification.  
The series of steps discussed, from connection request by the MySQL 
client to establishing sensor identification, is used to generate a new persistent 
session between sensor and database. The session between the MySQL client 
on the sensor and the MySQL database remains open until the Snort process is 
terminated or communications between the MySQL database and MySQL client 
are interrupted. The reason for leaving the session open is to reduce the 
overhead of establishing a new session every time an alert is sent to the 
database.  
Before sending an alert Snort will check for duplicate data by issuing a 
SQL SELECT command that queries the Snort database looking for matching 
alert signatures. If the alert signature already exists, then the event counter in the 
EVENT table of the Snort database is incremented and only new information 
such as source and destination IP addresses and the contents of the packet’s 
payload are sent to the database. If the alert signature is new, then new rows are 
created for the alert, including a new row in the SIGNATURE table. Information 
that is sent to the database in an INSERT command includes the sensor 
identification, time stamp, source and destination IP addresses, the signature 
that defines the attack, for example ‘Portscan’ and the payload of the captured 
network traffic that caused the alert. The final command sent by the MySQL 
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client is a COMMIT command that instructs the database to write the new data to 
the database. Every command sent by the MySQL client, such as BEGIN, 
INSERT, or COMMIT, the server responds with one of the following: OK, 
ERROR, or a Result Set in response to a SELECT command. The sequences 
provided in this discussion illustrate the two-way communication protocol used by 
the MySQL server and MySQL client. 
Responses from the MySQL server to the MySQL client on the sensor 
move from high to low, therefore, information in the return traffic will require 
downgrading by a trusted process before sending the response out to the sensor. 
Downgrading of classified documents is normally performed by a guard, which 
may also sanitize the contents of the document [22]. A sanitization process could 
be implemented to verify that return traffic contains only valid responses. 
Responses such as OK or ERROR are trivial to verify by inspecting the payload 
of the datagram. Responses to the SELECT command that contain data sets will 
be more complicated because of the myriad possibilities of legitimate responses 
coupled with the possibility that the payload could contain sensitive information. 
Alert information stored in the database requires a security label. If the 
data is not labeled then an analyst could accidently include sensitive data in an 
unclassified report. The following is an example of a row of data from the Snort 
database EVENTS table: 
1, 29, 1, ‘2008-04-10 19:24:41’ 
sid, cid, signature, timestamp 
The columns, delimited by a comma in this example, are the sensor 
identification (sid), a counter (cid), an index to the signature table (signature), and 
a timestamp (date).  If this information was sent from IDS2 on the secret network 
showed in Figure 6 then the information should be labeled ‘SECRET’. To 
accomplish this labeling the table requires another column for the label and the 
INSERT command sent by the MySQL client needs to be expanded to apply the 
label. The following is an example of a row of data after the modifications: 
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1, 29, 1, ‘2008-04-10 19:24:41’, SECRET 
sid, cid, signature, timestamp, class_label 
The task of expanding the INSERT command and labeling the data must 
be performed by a trusted process on the MLS server to ensure the veracity of 
the labels. A critical assumption is made that the database is benign and does 
not alter the labels, otherwise the information cannot be trusted and the 
architecture is flawed. 
C. REQUIREMENTS 
This section will cover the requirements to construct a working prototype 
based on the issues disclosed in the concept of operations from section A and 
Section B. 
1. IDS 
The sensor chosen for this project is an open source product called Snort. 
The reason for selecting Snort was covered in Chapter III. One of the goals of 
this project is to establish a template for implementing an IDS, therefore the only 
modifications to Snort will be those required to make the product operational. For 
example, the configuration file /etc/snort/snort.conf requires editing to set up 
certain parameters to make the IDS functional. Some of the required parameters 
are items such as what network to monitor and the authentication parameters for 
authenticating to the database. These types of modifications will be allowed. The 
implementation section will cover setting up the configuration file. 
2. Information Flow Control 
The communication flow between the database and sensor must not 
violate MLS policies. Any information flowing from high to low would require a 
guard process to verify that no classified information is leaked. 
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3.  Processes Running on MLS Server 
There are two requirements for running new processes on the MLS 
server. First, if the process is to be granted security and integrity exemptions the 
process must be a trusted process. A trusted process is a program, which is 
granted elevated privileges such as security and integrity exemptions. The 
behavior of the process must be analyzed to verify that it does not violate the 
overall intent of the system security policy. An untrusted process does not require 
such an analysis; therefore, behavior of the process is unknown but may be 
required to satisfy the system’s operational functionality. Second, any new code 
introduced must be compatible with the STOP 6.3 operating system. 
4. System High Database 
The chosen database must be able to run on an operating system that will 
allow it to run as a system high database in the MLS architecture. Snort supports 
various ODBC compliant databases.  
D.  DESIGN 
This section covers the design process based on the concept of 
operations and requirements sections. Preliminary tests using a small Linux 
environment were used to validate some concepts to help with the design 
process. Results from these tests are included in this section. 
1.  Preliminary Tests 
A small network consisting of three Debian 4.0 Linux systems was 
configured to prove some concepts that were described in the concept of 
operations. One system was configured as a sensor, one as the database server 
and the last one was a simulated XTS system, which did not emulate any MLS 
capabilities. 
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To assist with moving traffic between processes U, S, ML, Sys High, and 
the System High database (see Figure 5) the MySQL Proxy program was 
researched and tested as a possible solution. A proxy server services the 
requests of its clients by forwarding requests to other servers. A proxy service 
can act as client by sending requests and as a server by accepting requests. The 
MySQL Proxy program performs similarly to a standard proxy program however; 
the MySQL Proxy program only handles communications between MySQL 
clients and MySQL databases using the MySQL protocol. 
The first test was to install one proxy on a Debian 4.0 Linux system 
simulating an XTS and observe alerts transitioning from the IDS sensor to the 
database via the proxy. Figure 7 shows the network layout for the first test. 
Results of the test were satisfactory; therefore, the second test was performed. 
 
 
Figure 7: Test1 Basic Proxy Test 
 
Moving data from process U to process Sys High would require using 
multiple MySQL proxies therefore the second test experiments with using the 
proxies in a daisy chain configuration. Figure 8 illustrates the setup of two daisy-
chained proxies.  
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Figure 8: Daisy Chain Proxies 
 
To create the daisy chain between the two proxies requires Proxy 1 to be 
configured to send data to Proxy 2, which has been configured to use the local 
host address 127.0.0.1 and port number 5050. Proxy 2 then sends the data to 
the external database server at IP address 192.168.100.4. The second test was 
successful and demonstrated data moving from the sensor to the database via 
the two proxies. 
The third test utilizes MySQL Proxy’s built in Lua interpreter, which has the 
capability to monitor and change the contents of MySQL packets. Lua is another 
interpreted scripting language, similar to Perl or PHP [10]. Lua can be installed 
as a separate program but the developers of MySQL Proxy compiled the 
interpreter into the MySQL Proxy program [26]. Adding Lua to the MySQL Proxy 
program gives developers the ability to write scripts that can modify or monitor 
SQL statements as the data stream flows between client and server. For this 
test, a Lua script was written to perform a simple SQL injection by adding another 
INSERT command to append a classification label to the data being inserted. 
Figure 9 shows the layout for the third test.  
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Figure 9: Test 3 Lua Injection 
 
This test also required a small modification to the Snort database schema 
to include the additional data field for the label. The results from the third test 
were satisfactory. This series of tests demonstrated that using one or more 
MySQL proxies to move data between the required processes U, S, ML, Sys 
High and SH database appears to be a feasible solution. 
One constraint on any possible solution is porting new code to run on the 
STOP 6.3 operating system. This OS is similar to Red Hat 8 in regards to the 
libraries supported and the kernel programming interface. To determine if a new 
program might compile on the STOP 6.3 OS it is first compiled on a Red Hat 8 
system. The caveat however is that any compilation must use only the base Red 
Hat 8 image. This means there cannot be any foundational upgrades performed 
to the Red Hat 8 operating system such as upgrading kernel code because this 
would move the version level away from the original level.  
The fourth test was to compile the MySQL proxy code on a base Red Hat 
8 system. To complete the configuration phase of the compilation process a few 
libraries were installed such as glib-2.6.0, libevent-1.3e, lua-5.1.3 and the glibc 
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package was upgraded from 2.2.9 to 2.3.2, which was the last version of glibc 
configured for Red Hat 8. Compiling MySQL proxy on Red Hat 8 failed.  
Compilation of the MySQL proxy requires MySQL client and development 
files greater than version 5.0, which is not supported on Red Hat 8. The glibc 2.4 
package is also required but this package requires kernel 2.6.9. When executing 
'make' the first compilation error appears in mysql-proxy.c at line 194 with the 
error message, “structure has no member named org_name.” Since there were 
only five errors in this file of this type, the errors were resolved by commenting 
out the offending lines of code. The code was not vital because it only printed the 
names of the authors and their contact information. Re-running 'make' compiles 
mysql-proxy.c but yields new compilation errors in the file network-mysqld.c. Four 
variables were not found probably due to references to an incorrect version of a 
header file. The same source code was successfully compiled on Debian 4.0 by 
installing the following packages:  
pkg-config, liblua5.1-0, liblua5.1-dev, libevent-dev,(from .deb package), 
libevent1, libglib2.0-0, libglib2.0-dev, libmysqlclient-dev, libncurses5-
dev_5.5-5_i386.deb, libreadline5-dev_5.2-2_i386.deb 
Due to the compile errors, kernel and library requirements, and the fact 
that the code is only in the alpha stage of development, a determination was 
made that it was not feasible to try to alter the code to make it conform to Red 
Hat 8.  
Despite the fact that the Proxy code performed well on the Debian 4.0 
systems, and the fact that it cannot run on Red Hat 8 means there is a high 
probability it will not run on the STOP 6.3 operating system. Another issue that 
must be considered is the trustworthiness of the code. The proxy code consists 
of 19 files and over 12000 lines of code, none of which has been examined to 
determine if the code will always perform correctly. The level of the code is only 
in the alpha stage of design, which presents another concern for using this code.  
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These two factors prompted a change in the design strategy that will differ from 
what was covered in the concept of operations. 
2.  New Design for Implementation 
The first change from the original concept of operations was to switch the 
database software from MySQL to PostgreSQL. The primary reason for the 
change is that the new STOP 7 version comes with PostgreSQL 8.1 installed, 
however this version level of PostgreSQL is too high for STOP 6.3 therefore the 
PostgreSQL version will be 7.4.18, a version compatible with Red Hat 8. The 
Snort product includes a SQL script for creating the schema required for the 
Snort database for both MySQL and PostgreSQL and is fully compatible with the 
Snort sensor. The analysis tool BASE is also configured with full PostgreSQL 
support. Taking into account that future versions of STOP will support 
PostgreSQL along with the PostgreSQL compatibility with the IDS components, 
switching database software will provide a more stable implementation for this 
project. 
Another major change is the elimination of the external database server 
and external web server. These components will be hosted on the XTS400 and 
will be constrained by MAC policies enforced by MYSEA trusted processes and 
STOP OS itself. The IDS will communicate directly with the databases instead of 
communicating through a proxy. Even with PostgreSQL, there is still a 
requirement to provide two-way communication between the database and the 
sensor’s database client. Figure 10 illustrates the new design that satisfies the 
requirement to use multiple IDS sensors in a MLS architecture. 
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Figure 10: IDS Implementation Design 
 
When a Snort sensor either is initialized or sends an alert it will invoke the 
PostgreSQL client that is installed on the sensor. Reconfiguration of the network 
ports on the XTS400 to match the security and integrity level of each 
PostgreSQL instance will allow the IDS to communicate with their respective 
PostgreSQL databases. There are databases at each classification level 
because there is no trusted component to label or fuse the data as it is received. 
This design requires two instances of PostgreSQL and two separate BASE web 
applications.   
Access to the BASE web application is through the Apache web server 
application ‘httpd’ that is spawned by the SSS when an analyst makes an HTTP 
request. All data queries are invoked by the analyst using the PHP web pages 
that comprise the BASE application. In turn, the PHP interpreter makes a call to 
the PostgreSQL client to execute the requested SQL query and returns the result 
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set to be rendered in the PHP pages as readable data for the analyst.  Even 
though the alert data are separated, the analyst has an expedient access method 
to the data using web browsers. However, the analyst will have to perform 
manual correlation of data by generating reports and comparing results. 
3. Integration with DSS 
Figure 11 is a conceptual design that illustrates the use of email to notify 
the DSS administrator with IDS reports. The actual implementation of this 
approach is outside the scope of this thesis but the design is presented to 
demonstrate how an analyst could report the status of network activity to the 
DSS administrator.  
 
Figure 11: IDS Integration with DSS 
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The MYSEA server already supports the open source email program 
‘send mail’ to provide email capability to the users on the MLS network. Since the 
analyst is working from a COTS client, he could generate IDS reports using 
information from the BASE application and send those reports to the DSS 
administrator via email.  Reports sent to the DSS administrator would be 
categorized based on urgency. A string of text placed in the subject line of the 
email would identify the urgency level such as “Daily Status Report” for routine 
operations or “Emergency Action Report” for a critical alert that requires a 
response. Critical alerts would also trigger an alarm on the DSS administrator 
console. 
In the current MYSEA implementation, the DSS administrator can only 
access email from a COTS workstation on the MLS network, not from the system 
console. Further investigation is needed to determine the changes to the current 
MYSEA code to allow the DSS administrator to receive IDS reports via email at 
the console.  
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter covered an analysis of the original design concept that 
resulted in alterations to the design due to unexpected ‘cutting-edge’ software 
conflicts with the older STOP system.  The new design incorporates a few 
compromises such as splitting out the database repositories, but overall provides 
a viable functional prototype that can be fully incorporated into the MYSEA 
environment after the PostgreSQL processes are ported to use the MYSEA 
socket interface as explained in the future work section in Chapter VI. 
The next chapter, Implementation and Testing, will cover the installation 
and configuration of these components in two different environments: that of Red 
Hat 8 Linux, and for the XTS400. After the IDS components are installed, the 
final part will cover functional testing. 
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V. IMPLEMENTATION AND TESTING 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will review the implementation of the IDS components: 
sensors, database, and analysis tool, on the Linux Red Hat 8 system and 
describe the changes required to integrate all of these IDS components within 
the MYSEA architecture. The analysis section documents problems encountered 
during the implementation phase for the MYSEA architecture. The chapter 
concludes with a functional test plan that was designed and used to exercise the 
entire suite of components to verify that all components function as a coherent 
Intrusion Detection System. Appendix A and Appendix B provide detailed 
instructions for implementing these IDS components. 
B IDS IMPLEMENTATION ON THE RED HAT 8 SYSTEM 
This section covers the standard implementation of the IDS components 
on the Red Hat 8 Linux operating system. The reason for using the Red Hat 8 
system is covered in Chapter IV, and is to use an OS that is compatible with the 
STOP 6.3 operating system with respect to the version of the operating system’s 
kernel and supported libraries. The two main components that will be installed on 
Red Hat 8 are the PostgreSQL database and the BASE web application. The 
Snort sensor was, installed on a separate machine. 
1. IDS Sensor Installation (Snort) 
The detailed installation of Snort on the Debian 4.0 operating system is 
covered in Appendix A and Appendix B.  The Debian operating system was 
installed with the minimal libraries and programs required to create a functional 
Linux operating system, which means there were no graphical user interfaces 
(GUIs), or any other gratuitous services that could present attack vectors. After 
the OS was installed, other required software programs were added such as the 
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GCC compiler, PostgreSQL client and the libpcap library, which is a library 
required to support Snort’s packet capturing functions. 
Snort version 2.8.0.1 was installed using the source code obtained from 
www.snort.org. This was accomplished using the standard Linux installation 
method of running the ‘configure’ script then the ‘Makefile’ script and concluding 
with ‘make install’, which places the binary ‘snort’ into the ‘/usr/local/bin’ directory. 
Completing the Snort installation required editing the Snort configuration file 
‘snort.conf’ to enable parameters that determine items such as what network 
space to monitor, where to send alerts, and the location of the directory 
containing Snort rules. As a security measure, the open source firewall ‘lokkit’ 
was installed and configured to allow only the required ports for communication 
between PostgreSQL client and PostgreSQL server. 
2. PostgreSQL Server Installation 
The installation of PostgreSQL 7.4.18 server used source code obtained 
from www.postgres.org. The installation followed the standard Linux installation 
method of running the ‘configure’ script, followed by ‘Makefile’ script, and 
concluding with ‘make install’, which installed the binaries to ‘/usr/local/pgsq’ and 
other subdirectories under the ‘pgsql’ directory. Before the PostgreSQL server 
could be started, a database cluster was created by running the initialization 
program called ‘initdb’ with a directory location as an argument. A database 
cluster is a collection of databases that are managed by a single server instance 
[33].  
To satisfy the design requirement to use separately managed databases 
for storing alerts, this implementation required two instances of PostgreSQL 
server: one instance for an unclassified Snort database, and another instance for 
the Secret snort database. Creating additional PostgreSQL instances required 
initializing additional database clusters. To simulate the PostgreSQL 
implementation that will be required on the STOP 6.3 OS, two database clusters 
were created: ‘/var/postgresql/unclass_data’, and ‘/var/postgresql/secret_data’. 
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Each database cluster contained two configuration files that required editing. The 
first file, ‘postgresql.conf’, is used to establish various network parameters such 
as those to allow TCP/IP connections and to set the port number for TCP/IP 
communications. Each database instance used a distinct port number. The 
unclassified database used port 5433 and the secret database used port 5434. 
The default port for PostgreSQL is 5432.The second file, ‘pg_hba.conf’, is used 
to set the client authentication method for local and remote connections.  
The pg_hba.conf contains a synopsis of the authentication methods, 
which are also covered in the PostgreSQL documentation. Authentication for this 
lab experiment used the MD5 method. This method compares an MD5 hash of 
the stored password in the PostgreSQL pg_shadow catalog [32] and the hashed 
password that is offered by the PostgreSQL client installed on the sensor. Issues 
with MD5 and other authentication topics are covered in section C. To create 
databases for the Snort sensors required running a script called ‘createdb’, 
however, creating the database was performed by the intended owner of the 
database to ensure proper permissions. For this reason a Red Hat 8 system user 
called ‘snort’ and a PostgreSQL database user called ‘snort’ were created just for 
the purpose of creating a database called ‘snort’. The schema for the database 
was generated by running a SQL script included with the Snort distribution. After 
the schema was created, the databases were ready to receive alerts from their 
respective sensors. 
3. Web Application BASE Installation 
The Basic Analysis Security Engine (BASE) is a web application written in 
PHP with cascading style sheets to provide the web application with some 
uniform styling. BASE takes advantage of a database abstraction library called 
ADOdb, written in PHP, which is designed to increase performance between the 
database and web application [27]. Both of these products use the PHP scripting 
language interpreter, which needs to be installed and configured to work with the 
Apache web server. 
 52
There are three methods for installing the PHP interpreter to function with 
the Apache web server. One method will statically embed the PHP interpreter 
into the Apache binary (httpd), which is the fastest way to run PHP because both 
the PHP binary and httpd binary load into memory as one application. The httpd 
binary will increase in size by as much as five times its original size depending on 
the PHP options that were installed at compile time. The second method 
compiles PHP as a Dynamic Shared Object (DSO) module, which provides a 
way to build PHP as a separate binary, but links it to the httpd binary to load at 
run-time into the memory space of the httpd program. The final method uses 
PHP as a Common Gateway Interface (CGI) binary. This method does not 
integrate into the Apache executable file httpd but does require specific 
configuration settings in order to work securely and correctly. 
The DSO method was chosen for the Red Hat environment based on 
modularity considerations. The main advantage in using the DSO method is that 
if PHP requires recompilation to add additional features or upgrades, only the 
PHP binary is recompiled, not the httpd binary. When the static method is used, 
upgrading PHP requires recompilation of the PHP binary and the httpd binary.  
After compiling Apache to use DSO modules and installing PHP, the 
BASE web sites were setup under the default Apache root directory called 
‘htdocs’ that is used for serving web pages. Two BASE web sites were 
configured: one to access the unclassified PostgreSQL database and another to 
access the secret PostgreSQL database. 
To finish the BASE installation required accessing the BASE web site’s 
setup.php web page using a web browser from either the local server or any host 
that can access the Red Hat 8 server. This setup page is used to fill in 
parameters that will be written to a configuration file called base_conf.php.The 
setup is only performed once to initialize these parameters and create six new 
tables in the Snort database. After the setup is complete, the login page was 
displayed for the BASE web site. After logging in using the user name snort, the 
home page displayed a plethora of options for viewing and displaying alerts. 
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C. IDS IMPLEMENTATION FOR THE MYSEA ARCHITECTURE 
This section covers installation of the three IDS components in the 
MYSEA architecture. The database software PostgreSQL and web application 
BASE were installed on the STOP 6.3 operating system, which is the base for 
the MLS server. The MLS server manages objects by enforcing MAC policies on 
every object, e.g., users, files, directories, and processes. Users can change 
their security and integrity level by invoking the Secure Attention Key SAK (Alt+ 
SysReq), and then entering a security level and an integrity level. When working 
with objects the level of the object must be taken into account. A good rule of 
thumb when dealing with objects is knowing the Bell-LaPadula model for security 
(no write down, no read up) and Biba model for Integrity (no read down, no write 
up). 
The STOP 6.3 OS employs several levels and categories for security and 
integrity which gives developers flexibility in creating various classification levels. 
This installation is only concerned with the following five classification levels: 
• min:oss - Defined as security level 0 and integrity level 3  with all 
integrity categories enabled. The main directory structure of the OS 
is set at this level. 
• min:il3 - Defined by the MYSEA developers as SysLo (System 
Low), this is the setting for the MYSEA directory structure 
/usr/local/MYSEA and MYSEA web directories /home/http. 
• sl1:il0 - Defined as security level 1, integrity level 0, and is also 
defined as SIM_UNCLASSIFIED in the MYSEA architecture. This 
setting denotes the classification level ‘simulated unclassified’ for 
any object or session that is set to this level. 
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• sl5 sc1:il0 - Defined as security level 5 with category 1 set, and 
integrity level 0. This level serves as the SIM_SECRET level to 
denote the classification level ‘simulated secret’ for any object or 
session that is set to this level. 
• sl15 sc0…sc63:il0 - Defined as security level 15 with all security 
categories set, and integrity level 0. This level serves as the 
MYSEA system high level. 
1. IDS Sensor Installation (Snort) 
The implementation for Snort was the same as the installation discussed 
in Section A; therefore, the sensors are reused for the MYSEA architecture. Only 
the configuration file ‘snort.conf’ required changes to reflect different parameters 
such as database IP address or port numbers. 
2. XTS400 Network Settings 
The XTS400 server used for this implementation had four physical 
network ports. One port is used for the MYSEA MLS network and two ports are 
used to simulate two single-level networks: unclassified and secret. The security 
setting for the MLS port was set to the maximum level. The reason for the 
maximum setting was to prevent application processes such as Apache direct 
access to the NIC. Users establish a classification session using the TPE 
installed on the client. Sessions are managed by the Secure Session Server 
(SSS) to allow for all possible session levels. 
Currently there is no MLS routing or session server for hosts connected to 
the single level network ports. To allow TCP/IP communications between the 
sensors and their respective databases the security level of two network ports 
were reconfigured to match the security level of the two PostgreSQL instances. 
Ethernet device one (/dev/ether1) is set to sl1:il0 (SIM_UNCLASSIFIED) and  
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Ethernet device two (/dev/ether2) is set to sl5 sc1:il0 (SIM_SECRET). This 
allowed the PostgreSQL instances to offer database services running at these 
two different classification levels.  
3. PostgreSQL Installation 
The installation procedure for the PostgreSQL server on the STOP 6.3 OS 
is similar to those for Red Hat 8 and were performed as the user ‘admin’ at level 
min:oss, which means the newly installed directories and binaries are at the level 
min:oss. The database directories /var/postgresql/unclass_data and 
/var/postgresql/secret_data, required for the database clusters, were created 
using STOP’s file manager program, to set MAC and DAC permissions on these 
directories. The unclass_data directory is set to sl1:il0 and the secret_data 
directory is set to sl5 sc1:il0.  
The database initialization on the Red Hat 8 system could not be 
performed using the system account root because that method is not allowed by 
the PostgreSQL process, therefore a non-privileged account was created to 
initialize database areas and run the PostgreSQL process. The STOP operating 
system does not support the concept of a root user, but instead of having the 
default account admin initialize the databases and run the PostgreSQL 
processes a lesser privileged account called 'postgres' was created using 
STOP's account management program. 
The remainder of the installation followed the same steps as the Red Hat 
8 installation. The configuration files had to be edited, the snort user and snort 
database must be created. Performing these steps required being at the 
applicable classification levels. 
To avoid having to start the databases manually, two daemons were 
created using STOP’s daemon editing program. When the databases were 
completed, a quick test using the locally installed PostgreSQL client ‘psql’ was 
used to ensure connectivity and that the databases were ready to receive data. 
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4. Basic Analysis Security Engine (BASE) Installation 
Implementing PHP on STOP 6.3 as a DSO module, which was the 
method performed in the Red Hat 8 environment, was not possible due to 
modifications performed on the Apache source code. Apache was ported to the 
MYSEA environment to work in conjunction with other MYSEA components. To 
compile the DSO module PHP uses a support program from Apache called 
‘apxs’, which simplifies the creation of DSO files for Apache modules [28]. To 
compile PHP as a DSO module Apache must have been compiled with the 
module ‘mod_so’ enabled. This is checked by the PHP configuration script via 
the apxs support program. To manually check to see which modules are installed 
the httpd program is executed with the ‘-l’ option, for example, enter ‘./httpd -l’ at 
the command prompt, press the enter key then check the output. One line of the 
output will contain the string mod_so.c, which indicates Apache was compiled 
with the dependent module mod_so. The apxs script performs this same 
procedure programmatically then performs a string match on the output. If the 
string mod_so.c is not present, the script fails outputting an error that Apache 
was not compiled with mod_so enabled. 
Performing this check on the altered httpd binary file yielded no visible 
output. Without the proper output, the apxs support program fails, which in turn 
causes the PHP configuration script to fail. To circumvent this issue PHP was 
compiled as a static module. A static compilation of PHP embeds the PHP 
interpreter into the httpd binary program. Both of these methods, static link and 
DSO, have positive and negative aspects that will be examined in the next 
section. 
Two directories were created to support the BASE web application 
(/idsdemo/base_unclass, /idsdemo/base_secret) under the Apache root directory 
/home/http/htdocs. Using STOP’s file management program the proper security 
and integrity levels are applied to the separate directories. Completing the 
installation required using a web browser on a client machine that has the TPE 
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program installed. First, a user session was set to ‘SIM_UNCLASSIFIED’ and 
then the URL for the BASE setup page for the base_unclass web site was 
entered into a web browser. This web page instructs the user to provide various 
parameters then finalizes the installation. The user session was changed to 
SIM_SECRET and then the URL for the base_secret site was entered into a web 
browser to perform this same procedure at this level.  When both sites are 
configured, there are two identical web applications with one application for the 
unclassified data and one application for the secret data. 
D. ANALYSIS OF MYSEA IDS IMPLEMENTATION 
This section will conduct an analysis of issues that were identified during 
the implementation of the IDS components in the MYSEA architecture. These 
issues are deferred for future work but are presented in this section to provide 
some insight. The main issues to be covered are sensor authentication, PHP 
access to PostgreSQL  and PHP integration with Apache.  
1. IDS Sensor Authentication 
PostgreSQL server provides several authentication methods from the 
simple unsecure ‘trust’ authentication method, which requires no password, to 
the highly secure Kerberos authentication method. This implementation used the 
MD5 encrypted password method as a middle ground solution. Using Kerberos 
requires an authentication server, which the MYSEA architecture currently does 
not employ. Due to the weakness of the MD5 protocol and because the way in 
which it was implemented in PostgreSQL, MD5 should not be a long-term 
solution. 
The MD5 authentication methodology stores a hash of the user’s 
password in the pg_shadow table, which is part of the system catalog and is not 
accessible by public accounts [32]. When the hash is generated, the user’s name 
is used as the salt vice using a randomly generated salt [29]. Most PostgreSQL 
implementations tend to use the username ‘postgres’ as the account name 
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during initialization of database clusters and as the owner of the PostgreSQL 
processes. Snort implementations tend to use the word ‘snort’ as the owner of 
the snort database. Any hacker who compromised a sensor or realized there are 
active communications between a Snort sensor and a PostgreSQL database 
could possibly have two salts, which would allow for easier breakage of the hash 
once it was retrieved. 
Another security issue with IDS sensor authentication is the storage of 
passwords in the snort.conf configuration file. One section of the snort.conf file 
stores database connection parameters such as IP address, port number, 
username and password. If a hacker gains access to a sensor as root, they now 
know one password that will permit access to the remote Snort database. There 
is currently no real solution for this security hole.  
2. PostgreSQL, BASE and Multilevel Access 
Accessing a PostgreSQL database is performed by using client software 
that utilizes the PostgreSQL protocol. PostgreSQL software installation includes 
a client named ‘psql’, which is normally used for accessing the databases. 
Making a connection consists of invoking the program and passing in a user 
name and password as minimum arguments. All authorized accesses to a 
particular database are treated as read/write access unless specific permissions 
have been established at the table level.  
The BASE web application uses the resident ‘psql’ client installed on the 
STOP 6.3 system to service SQL queries embedded in the PHP scripts that 
comprise the BASE application. When an analyst establishes a SIM_SECRET 
session, that analyst has read/write access to the base_secret web site but also 
has read access to the base_unclass web site.  If the BASE authentication 
method (Step 3 of 5 from the BASE setup page from Appendix A and Appendix 
B) is being used then the first page of either BASE web site is a login page that 
validates given credentials based on a set of established credentials stored in the 
Snort database. When the analyst enters credentials for the base_unclassified 
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web site, the return will be a PostgreSQL database connection error. The reason 
for the error is the enforcement of the MAC policies. This behavior can be 
duplicated locally on the XTS400 by logging in as ‘postgres’, setting the security 
and integrity levels to <sl5 sc1:il0>, and attempting a login to the unclassified 
database using the ‘psql’ database client program. The output error will be 
identical to that viewed in the web page. 
To provide true MLS support an analyst should be able to view the 
contents of a database in read only mode that is at a lower security level and 
equal or higher integrity level than the established session level. Currently 
analysts will only be able to view data whose level equals the established 
session level. 
3. PHP Integration with MYSEA Apache 
A standard Apache installation is configured to run the httpd process 
under a parent process, which forks a number of child processes to handle 
incoming HTTP requests. Among the resources for this configuration are memory 
space for the parent process and memory space to handle new connections. 
When PHP is integrated into Apache the memory usage increases based on the 
request of dynamic content, i.e., PHP web pages. PHP is allocated memory 
using the malloc (memory allocation) function and uses the allocated memory 
until the PHP process is terminated.  
The MYSEA implementation of Apache utilizes the same approach used 
by inetd daemon to handle HTTP requests. When a HTTP request is received 
from a client, the SSS process, an inetd-like program, launches the httpd server 
program to handle the request and then terminates the program when the 
request is complete. With this method, each HTTP request from a client causes a 
new httpd program to spawn and run as the user account making the request 
instead of using a non-privileged account such as ‘apache’. This method is 
suitable for the MYSEA architecture since the application processes are not 
trusted and should not be able to directly access the MLS network.  Before 
 60
implementing PHP, the MYSEA httpd file size was 1.1 Megabytes, after the PHP 
implementation the file size grew to 5.8 Megabytes. When a client makes a 
HTTP request, irrespective of requiring PHP, the new httpd will require 5.8 
Megabytes of memory to be allocated to service that client request instead of 
allocating 1.1 Megabytes of memory. If there were 100 simultaneous HTTP 
requests, the server would have to allocate over a half of gigabyte of memory to 
service the requests. 
The DSO PHP implementation used in the Red Hat 8 environment is not 
possible until the MYSEA httpd is ported to provide the correct output required by 
the Apache ‘apxs’ support program. However, this method uses the same 
amount of memory as the static method; therefore, this implementation is of no 
real advantage with respect to memory usage. Another alternative was to 
compile PHP as a Common Gateway Interface (CGI) binary. When used as a 
CGI binary, the PHP interpreter is used as a standalone program, which is only 
invoked when a HTTP request involves a PHP web page. The httpd binary 
remains unchanged, only the configuration file (http.conf) is altered to handle the 
servicing of PHP web pages. This method uses fewer memory resources 
because the PHP interpreter is only invoked when a HTTP request involves 
parsing PHP web pages.  
There are two common methodologies employed when using PHP as a 
CGI binary. If the PHP binary is to be placed outside of the web directory 
structure, for example placing PHP in /usr/local/bin, then every PHP web page 
will require the directive ‘#!/usr/local/bin/php’ to be placed in the first line of the 
PHP script. The other method is to place the PHP binary in the web directory 
structure in the cgi-bin directory; however, in this case all PHP pages will need to 
be placed under this directory as well. 
Using PHP as a CGI binary requires less memory since the PHP 
interpreter is only invoked when a HTTP request involves parsing a PHP web 
page, however, there is an overhead in processing and response time since the 
PHP interpreter is called for every PHP web page request. Properly securing 
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PHP to function as a CGI binary is another issue. CERT Advisory CA-1996-11 
[30] states that no interpreters should be placed in the cgi-bin directory. If an 
attacker gained access to the cgi-bin directory, he could remotely execute any 
command that the interpreters can execute on the server. Due to the unique 
nature of the MYSEA architecture's MLS security configuration, further analysis is 
required to determine whether this would be a security concern. 
 A possible security risk exists due to the method of placing the PHP 
binary outside of the web directory structure. If a PHP web page was requested 
by any user and the PHP interpreter failed to parse that requested web page the 
output would be the source code of that PHP web page rendered as clear text. 
This could potentially lead to a loss of proprietary or sensitive information. 
The CGI method was not pursued due to time constraints in testing the 
security of the CGI implementation in conjunction with the PHP code that 
comprises the BASE web application. 
E. FUNCTIONAL TEST PLAN AND REPORTS 
This section will cover a comprehensive functional test plan that will 
demonstrate the functionality of the IDS components in both environments. The 
installation instructions in Appendix A and Appendix B include component 
functional testing; therefore, that level of testing will not be addressed in this test 
plan. The functional test plan described in this section uses a test program called 
IDSWakeup [31] to provide a variety of alerts and to establish a baseline to 
determine how many alerts each sensor should detect. Both the Red Hat 8 Linux 
and XTS400 environments were tested. Appendix C contains the detailed steps 
for conducting each test. Figure 12 shows the physical layout of the machines 
used for these tests. 
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Figure 12: Lab Setup 
 
1. Test Plan Objectives: Red Hat 8 Linux and XTS400 
Environments 
The first objective of the functional testing is to verify that the IDS sensor, 
Snort, is actually monitoring the traffic and looking for malicious traffic. When 
malicious traffic is discovered, Snort should send an alert via the PostgreSQL 
client resident on the sensor to the remote PostgreSQL database. The second 
objective is to verify that new alerts are stored in the database, and that the data 
is accessible by the BASE web application for displaying information pertaining to 
the alerts. A third objective is to ensure the segregation of network traffic 
between the sensors and their respective databases. Traffic monitored by IDS1 
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should not be seen by IDS2 and vice versa. To accomplish these testing 
objectives the test program IDSWakeup will be used to generate fake attacks. 
IDSWakeup is a false positive generator that sends IP packets containing 
fake malicious data to a destination IP address. Snort construes this data as 
actual malicious data, thus causing an alert to trigger. Not all of the fake alerts 
generated by IDSWakeup may be suitable for testing Snort. The false attacks are 
stateless attacks, which mean there is no established TCP/IP connection 
between the remote host and the machine sending the false attacks. The current 
version of Snort is better at determining if these stateless attacks warrant an alert 
over the previous versions of Snort.  To illustrate this point, R. Bejtlich [34], used 
IDSWakeup to test Snort 2.6.1.5. Out of 181 packets sent by IDSWakeup, only 
26 alerts were generated by Snort.  
The method for the test was to attack a system on the same network 
segment as the sensors IDS1 and IDS2, thus testing that IDS1 and IDS2 are 
properly monitoring the network traffic. To conduct the test another Debian 
machine was created (hostname Attacker) to serve as the attack platform and 
configured with the IDSWakeup program. 
2. Functional Test: Red Hat 8 Linux Environment 
Before commencing the test, each component was verified to be 
functioning properly. Refer to the installation instructions in Appendix A or 
Appendix B for performing component-level functional tests.  
The first test sent the fake attacks to the unclassified IP address of the 
Red Hat 8 server (192.168.100.3). The expected result is that IDS1 should detect 
some attacks and send alerts to its respective PostgreSQL database on the Red 
Hat 8 server. The number of attacks sent by IDSWakeup that IDS1 will actually 
identify as attacks was unknown so the first attempt served as a baseline. IDS2 
should not send alerts because it should not see any of the fake attacks if the 
networks are properly separated.  
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The attack machine was reconfigured for the secret network and the test 
was repeated, sending the fake attacks to the secret IP address on the Red Hat 
8 server (192.168.101.3). The expected result for this test was that IDS2 should 
detect the same number and type of attacks that IDS1 detected and the alert 
count on IDS1 should not increase. 
3. Functional Test Report: Red Hat 8 Linux Environment 
After IDSWakeup completed its first test run against IDS1, the unclassified 
web site BASE was accessed. Table 4 shows the breakdown of alerts detected 
by Snort as viewed on the home page of the BASE unclassified website. The 
secret BASE web site showed zero alerts, which is the expected result and 
verifies that network traffic was properly segmented. 
At the completion of the second test run, the secret BASE web site 
showed that the same type and number of alerts detected by IDS1 were detected 
by IDS2. Table 5 shows the data recorded from this test. Accessing the 
unclassified BASE web site showed that the previous alert count did not 
increase, therefore the network traffic was properly segmented and each IDS 
sent alert data to the proper PostgreSQL database. 
RH8 IDS1 
Total # Alerts Unique Alerts TCP% UPD% ICMP% Portscan Traffic % 
18 12 56% 22% 11% 11% 
Table 4: IDS1 Alerts Sent 
 
RH8 IDS2 
Total # Alerts Unique Alerts TCP% UPD% ICMP% Portscan Traffic % 
18 12 56% 22% 11% 11% 
Table 5: IDS2 Alerts Sent 
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Using the test program IDSWakeup the following test objectives were 
verified: 
 a. IDS sensor can monitor traffic in promiscuous mode 
b. IDS sensor can detect known malicious traffic and generates 
valid alerts 
 c. Network traffic is properly segmented 
 d. Alerts are properly stored in the proper database 
 e. Alert data is accessible from the BASE application 
4. Functional Test: XTS400 Environment 
The same testing methodology was repeated for the XTS400 environment 
using the same IDS sensors that were used in the Red Hat 8 Linux environment. 
To counteract denial of service attacks Snort uses threshold times for sending 
alerts. If the IDSWakeup test were looped, Snort would eventually stop sending 
alerts. This factor was taken into account when these tests were repeated soon 
after testing the Red Hat 8 environment, however, due to the time required to 
reconfigure the Attacker machine and low frequency of test runs, there was no 
expectation that the threshold times would be reached. The expected results are 
that IDS1 and IDS2 will detect the same number and type of attacks but alerts 
will be sent to the databases on the XTS400 system. 
The enforcement of MAC policies will also be tested by using the user 
‘mdemo1’ that was configured during the MYSEA environment installation to 
access the unclassified BASE web site and secret BASE web site. The standard 
MYSEA installation procedures were used to set up the test environment. Since 
the Attacker machine was still configured for the secret network, the testing 
started by running the IDSWakeup test against IDS2. To view alerts a 
SIM_SECRET session was established for user mdemo1 and the secret BASE 
web site was accessed to view the alerts.  
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The Attacker machine was reconfigured to operate on the unclassified 
network and the IDSWakeup test was repeated, this time against IDS1. To 
access the unclassified web site a SIM_UNCLASSIFIED session was 
established for the user mdemo1. 
5. Functional Test Report: XTS400 Environment 
The data recorded in Tables 6 and 7, obtained by viewing each BASE web 
application, shows that the sensors were able to detect malicious traffic and send 
alerts about that malicious traffic to their respective databases. 
To test MAC poli cies an attempt to access the secret BASE web site was 
made while the user mdemo1 was logged in under a SIM_UNCLASSIFIED 
session. The result was a web page informing that access to the BASE web site 
was forbidden.  
XTS400 IDS1 
Total # Alerts Unique Alerts TCP% UPD% ICMP% Portscan Traffic % 
16 10 63 25 13 0 
Table 6: IDS1 Alerts Sent 
XTS400 IDS2 
Total # Alerts Unique Alerts TCP% UPD% ICMP% Portscan Traffic % 
16 10 63 25 13 0 
Table 7: IDS2 Alerts Sent 
 
Using the IDSWakeup program and attempting to violate MAC policies 
verified the following objectives: 
a. IDS sensor can monitor traffic in promiscuous mode 
b. IDS sensor detected known malicious traffic and generates valid 
alerts 
c. Network traffic is properly segmented 
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d. Alerts are properly stored in the proper database 
e. Alert data is accessible from the BASE application 
f. MAC policies are enforced by the MYSEA programs and STOP 
6.3 OS with respect to database accesses and web site access 
F. SUMMARY 
Implementing the PostgreSQL databases and BASE web application on 
the MLS server required some customization because of the MAC policies 
employed on the STOP 6.3 operating system and previous modifications to the 
Apache source code.  The implementation of the IDS components was 
successful and the functional test verified that the IDS components functioned as 
expected in both environments. The next chapter presents a conclusion about 
the overall contribution of IDSes in the MYSEA architecture and possible future 
work. 
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VI CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
This chapter states the conclusions of this thesis and discusses possible 
future work related to IDS integration in the MYSEA architecture. 
A. CONCLUSION 
The goal of this thesis was to provide a method to integrate an Intrusion 
Detection System into the MYSEA architecture and provide security analysts with 
an analysis tool, accessible from any workstation within the MLS network, to 
analyze all alerts sent by the IDS sensors.  Results from background research on 
IDSes established that the typical deployment of IDSes uses the three 
components that were implemented in this project: sensors, databases, and 
analysis tools. Using a formal selection process, the sensor selected for this 
project was the open source product Snort from Sourcefire. To store alerts sent 
from Snort, the open source database product PostgreSQL was chosen. To view 
alert data in a tractable format, the open source product Basic Analysis Security 
Engine (BASE) was used. 
Implementation of these components in the MYSEA architecture 
constituted the main challenge of this work. Several designs were considered. 
The first design, based on preliminary testing, utilized one central database, 
however due to complications associated with trying to move data between 
networks at different classification levels, an alternative design was created that 
used multiple databases, one for each sensor. This design allows use of the tool 
BASE to analyze network traffic and formulate a complete picture concerning 
probable network attacks.  
The preferred design, which supported storage of all alerts in one external 
central database, was altered due to complications with the installation of a key 
component, the MySQL proxy software, on the STOP 6.3 operating system. 
Instead of one central repository each IDS sends data to its own remote 
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database, which is installed on the MLS server. The project clearly demonstrated 
that it was possible to implement the required components to create a functional 
Intrusion Detection System. 
The current implementation may not be the optimal implementation, but 
the MYSEA architecture is constantly undergoing development and refinement. It 
is to be expected that as the MYSEA architecture moves from STOP operating 
system version 6.3 to version 7.0 there will be significant improvements to the 
IDS implementation method. 
B. FUTURE WORK 
The following issues became known during this project and warrant further 
study. 
1. Labeling Data 
In the Concept of Operations section, an assumption was made that the 
database is benign and does not alter the security classification labels that were 
applied by the ML process. The ML process (see Figure 5) receives data from 
processes U and S and applies a label to the data at the application layer with a 
security classification before the data is forwarded to process Sys High. The 
protection of the classification labels from malicious or unintended permutations 
should be addressed. 
The ML process could provide an integrity check through the use of "crypto 
seals" applied to the embedded labels. As data is transferred between the database 
and MYSEA client machine used by the analyst, the ML process would verify the 
integrity of the data by checking the crypto seal.  
2. MySQL Proxy Program 
The MySQL Proxy code used in preliminary testing is neoteric code. The 
problem with compiling and implementing the MySQL Proxy was covered in 
Chapter IV, Section D. It was determined through testing on a Red Hat 8 system 
that this code would be incompatible with the existing libraries on the STOP 6.3 
operating system. 
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The STOP 7 operating system may support the programs and libraries 
required to compile the MySQL proxy code.. Therefore, research could be 
applied to the feasibility in implementing the MySQL proxy code on the STOP 7 
operating system. This proxy code may yield some benefits to future IDS 
implementations. 
3. Read Down Support 
During installation and testing of the BASE web sites, an observation was 
made that when a session is established at SIM_SECRET the user of that 
session cannot access data from the unclassified Snort database via the 
unclassified BASE application. At the SIM_SECRET session level, the user 
should be able to perform a “read down” of the data in the unclassified Snort 
database. When an attempt was made to access data from the unclassified Snort 
database via the unclassified BASE application, the result was a database 
connection error. Full details of this observation are covered in Chapter V, 
Section D. 
For the analysis tool, BASE, to exhibit read down capabilities, 
modifications would have to be made to the code. The current application makes 
SQL queries to the database, which require both, read and write access. 
Research is required to either modify the database and BASE application to 
support read down capabilities or to implement a trusted database proxy. 
4. PHP Implementation 
Neither implementation of PHP, either as a DSO module, nor as a static 
module, is an optimal solution for the MYSEA environment due to the amount of 
memory each implementation uses. The security issues related to using PHP as 
a CGI binary resulted in a suboptimal solution as well.  
One area for future research is the use of light and heavy httpd binaries. 
When dynamic content such as PHP is required, the light httpd could proxy to the 
heavy httpd to handle the request. The heavy httpd would be compiled with all 
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required modules such as mod_perl, mod_php, and so on. The light httpd is only 
compiled with the minimum modules required to create a functional httpd binary. 
One required module would be the proxy module. This method would eliminate 
the security risks of using an interpreter such as CGI, and potentially would save 
memory resources. Only the processing delay between the light httpd and heavy 
httpd is a potential issue. 
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APPENDIX A RED HAT 8 LAB INSTALLATION 
This appendix outlines the installation procedures for installing all of the 
IDS components using the Linux Debian 4.0 operating system and Linux Red Hat 
8 operating system.  Apache, PostgreSQL, and Basic Analysis Security Engine 
(BASE) will be installed on the Red Hat 8 and Snort will be installed on Debian 
4.0.  
To view the BASE web site a client with a web browser such as Internet 
Explorer or Firefox is also required. . 
A. INSTALLATION AND TEST TOPOLOGY 
The test topology is comprised of three physical machines and four virtual 
machines (VMs) built using VMWare Workstation from VMWare.  Figure 13 
shows the topology that was used to perform the installation and tests for this 
project. 
Dell workstation:  
 2.8 GHz CPU with 2GBs RAM 
 Two physical network ports 
 Four virtual machines with virtual bridging 
  Bridge 0: IDS1, Red Hat 8, Attacker 
  Bridge 1: IDS2, Red Hat 8, Attacker 
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Figure 13: Lab Setup 
 
Installing the desktop operating system, Red Hat 8, VMWare, and 
configuring VMWare workstation is beyond the scope of this project. 
1. Conventions used in this Documentation 
All commands that need to be typed at the command prompt are italicized 
and in Courier New font. All items that are typed into a configuration file are in 
Courier New font. 
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B. INSTALLING SNORT ON DEBIAN 4.0 
This section covers installing the Debian, Snort, and other programs 
required to support Snort. 
1. Debian Operating System Installation 
1. Insert Debian DVD-1 and boot up the PC or VM 
2. Select english for language 
3. Select United States for country 
4. Select American English for keymap 
5. DO NOT USE DHCP, configure the network manually. Enter the 
following information (refer to lab diagram for IP addresses) 
 IP: IDS1 - 192.168.100.10 IP: IDS2 - 192.168.101.10 
 Net Mask for both IDS1 and IDS2: 255.255.255.0 
 Gateway <leave blank> 
 DNS server <leave blank> 
6. Enter a hostname: For IDS1: IDS1 For IDS2: IDS2 
7. Enter domain name: <leave blank> 
8. Partition Disk: 
 Select Guided - use entire disk 
 Partitioning scheme - select Separate /home, /usr, /var, and /tmp 
partitions 
Install will compute partition space. Select Finish partitioning and write 
changes to disk then yes to commit changes 
9. Configure time zone, set for PST 
10. Set root's password 
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11. Add a user and password 
12. Install will set up base system 
13. Select no for network mirror, all software should be installed from one 
of the three DVDs or from CD1 
14. Select no to participate in package survey 
15. Software selection 
Unselect Desktop environment 
Unselect Standard system.  
16. Select Yes to install GRUB boot loader to the master boot record 
17. Reboot into the finished system 
2. Support Software Installation 
Use apt-get install to install software from the Debian DVD. 
Example lets install ssh so a ssh terminal can be used if needed. 
1. apt-get install ssh 
Follow the prompts to complete the installation 
2. Install the following packages from DVD-1. These will be required for 
installing libpcap and snort 
 gcc  g++ make postgresql-client flex  bison libpcre3 libpcre3-dev  
 libpq-dev  
apt-get install gcc g++ make postgresql-client flex 
bison libpcre3 libpcre3-dev libpq-dev 
3. Libpcap0.9.8 Installation 
1. Use libpcap0.9.8.tar.gz file provided on CD1 /snort-2.8.0.1 
2. Copy tar file to /usr/local/src 
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 cd /usr/local/src 
tar –xvzf libpcap-0.9.8.tar.gz 
 cd libpcap-0.9.8 
 ./configure 
 make 
 make install 
4. Snort Installation 
1. Use the snort tar file provided on CD1 /snort-2.8.0.1 
2. Copy tar file to /usr/local/src 
 cd /usr/local/src 
 tar –xvf snort-2.8.0.1.tar 
 cd snort-2.8.0.1 
./configure --with-postgresql --enable-dynamicplugin 
 make 
 make install 
 mkdir /etc/snort 
 mkdir /var/log/snort 
 groupadd snort 
 useradd –g snort snort 
 chown snort:snort /var/log/snort 
5. Snort Rules Installation 
1. Use the snort rules tar file provided on CD1 /snort-2.8.0.1 
2. Copy the rules tarball to /etc/snort 
 cd /etc/snort 
 tar –xvzf snortrules-snapshot-CURRENT.tar.gz 
 cp /usr/local/src/snort-2.8.0.1/etc/*.conf* /etc/snort 
 cp /usr/local/src/snort-2.8.0.1/etc/*.map  /etc/snort 
3. Configure the snort.conf file located at /etc/snort/snort.conf.  Change 
the following lines less the quotes: 
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‘var HOME_NET any’ change to: 
‘var HOME_NET 192.168.100.0/24’ #for IDS1 
‘var HOME_NET 192.168.101.0/24’ #for IDS2 
‘var EXTERNAL_NET any’ change to: 
‘var EXTERNAL_NET !$HOME_NET’ 
Search on the string ‘var RULE_PATH’, change the line to: 
‘var RULE_PATH /etc/snort/rules’ 
*Functional Test* 
1. Start snort with the following command 
snort –D –u snort –g snort –c /etc/snort/snort.conf 
2. Check that eth0 enters promiscuous mode 
3. Check /var/log/syslog for Snort initialization completed successfully 
(pid=some number) 
tail -f /var/log/syslog 
4. Run a portscan on the IDS using nmap or any available port scanner. 
check /var/log/snort/alerts for a portscan priority 3 message 
tail -f /var/log/snort/alerts 
5. If snort works then kill the snort process and continue 
 ps aux | grep snort 
 kill <pid number of snort process> 
*End Functional Test* 
6. Finalize Sensor Installation 
Change configuration file and send alerts to Red Hat  
STOP! 
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NOTE: Before proceeding with these steps, complete the installation 
procedures for PostgreSQL including setting up the schema for the snort 
database. 
*Functional Test* 
1. Run the following command:  
psql -h 192.168.100.3  -U snort -d snort 
NOTE: The IP address will vary according to your network configuration 
2. <Observe: should get a snort=> prompt. Exit from psql with \q 
*End Functional Test* 
3. Edit snort.conf to send all alerts to the PostgreSQL database 
 cd /etc/snort 
 edit snort.conf 
 page down to Step #4: Configure output plugins 
 find the line # output database: alert, postgresql… 
 NOTE: search for postgres with your editor’s search feature 
 Configure the parameters so the line looks like this: 
output database: log, postgresql, user=snort 
dbname=snort port=5433 host=192.168.100.3 
NOTE: your parameters will vary based on your network settings and port 
settings: 
RH8 network 1: 192.168.100.3 
RH8 network 2: 192.168.101.3 
Unclassified Postgresql database: port 5433 
Secret Postgresql database: port 5434 
*Functional Test* 
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4. Start snort and check that it initialized correctly: 
snort –D –u snort –g snort –c /etc/snort/snort.conf 
tail –f /var/log/syslog 
5. Repeat the portscan test. This time the alert should go to the 
PostgreSQL database.  Log into the PostgreSQL database either remotely from 
the IDS or locally on the database server: 
 snort=> select * from event; 
 snort=> select * from signature; 
Depending on the port scanner used there may be one or two events and 
one or two signatures. 
*End Functional Test* 
7. Lokkit Firewall Installation 
To give the sensor some protection install a simple iptables based firewall 
called lokkit 
1.  Copy lokkit_0.50.22-7.1_i386.deb from CD1 /misc to /usr/local/src 
 dpkg –i lokkit lokkit_0.50.22-7.1_i386.deb 
2.  Run the command lokkit 
3.  Choose medium and customize 
Allow port 22 for SSH and the port for the PostgreSQL database you wish 
to send alerts. The database port must be added for two-way communication 
between database server and IDS. 
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C. INSTALLING POSTGRESQL 7.4.18 ON RED HAT 8 
1. Create System Accounts 
Create two users; postgres and snort. User postgres will own the 
postmaster process and snort is used to make the databases. Neither user 
requires any elevated privileges. 
adduser postgres 
adduser snort 
change password for each user 
passwd <username> then follow the prompts 
2. PostgreSQL 7.4.18 Installation 
Perform the following steps as root: 
1. Copy postgresql-base-7.4.18.tar.gz to /usr/local/src from CD1 
/postgres-7.4.18 
 tar -xvzf postgresql-base-7.4.18.tar.gz  
 cd postgresql-7.4.18 
NOTE: Compiling Postgresql requires gmake > 3.76.1 
 gmake --version = 3.79.1 on RH  
 ISO/ANSI C compiler such as GCC 
 GNU Flex and Bison 
2. Run configure  
 ./configure  
 Default installation is installed at /usr/local/pgsql.  All other files will 
install to sub-directories under /pgsql 
 Use ./configure --help to list other alternatives  
3. Start build with gmake 
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 gmake 
<Observe: "All of PostgreSQL successfully made. Ready to install" 
4. (optional) Regression Tests 
 As a non-privileged user: 
 gmake check  
5. Install the files 
 gmake install  
<Observe: Installed with no errors> 
3. Post-installation Setup 
1. Update Environment Variables 
 add the following two lines to /etc/profile 
PATH=/usr/local/pgsql/bin:$PATH
 MANPATH=/usr/local/pgsql/man:$MANPATH 
2. Initialize a database storage area on disk  
 mkdir /usr/local/pgsql/data 
 chown postgres /usr/local/pgsql/data 
 su postgres 
 initdb -D /usr/local/pgsql/data 
 <observe:  
The files belonging to this database system will be owned by user 
"postgres"…     
> 
3. Starting and stopping the database server as user postgres   
Use the pg_ctl script as user postgres 
Type pg_ctl --help for options 
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Start:  
pg_ctl start -D  /usr/local/pgsql/data -l serverlog 
Stop: 
pg_ctl stop -D /usr/local/pgsql/data -m fast 
*Functional Test* 
4. Start the database and test the setup by making a database called 
mydb then login as postgres. PostgreSQL 7.4.18 requires logging in with 
username and database unless username and database are the same name. 
 pg_ctl start -D /usr/local/pgsql/data -l logfile 
 createdb mydb 
 psql -U postgres -d mydb 
 \q 
Stop the database 
 pg_ctl stop -D /usr/local/pgsql/data -m fast 
 exit (to exit the su postgres shell) 
*End Functional Test* 
5.  Setting up to simulate multi-level access on a STOP 6.3.1 OS:  
Make the following directories as user root: 
mkdir /var/postgresql 
mkdir /var/postgresql/unclass_data 
mkdir /var/postgresql/secret_data 
 Change owner to user postgres:  
chown postgres /var/postgresql/unclass_data  
chown postgres /var/postgresql/secret_data 
su postgres 
initdb -D /var/postgresql/unclass_data 
initdb -D /var/postgresql/secret_data 
 Edit each postgresql.conf file 
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On both files enable tcpip connections: tcpip_socket = true 
Give each instance a different port number 
 unclass_data: port = 5433 
 secret_data: port = 5434 
Edit pg_hba.conf for each data cluster area. Page down to the end of the 
file. 
  /var/postgresql/unclass_data/pg_hba.conf 
   TYPE: host 
   DATABASE: snort 
   USER: snort 
   IP_ADDRESS: 192.168.100.0 
   MASK: 255.255.255.0 
   AUTH_TYPE: MD5 
  /var/postgresql/secret_data/pg_hba.conf 
   TYPE: host 
   DATABASE: snort 
   USER: snort 
   IP_ADDRESS: 192.168.101.0 
   MASK: 255.255.255.0 
   AUTH_TYPE: MD5    
*Functional Test*  
Start the unclass data area from directory /var/postgresql/unclass_data 
cd /var/postgresql/unclass_data 
pg_ctl start -D /var/postgresql/unclass_data -l logfile 
Check the logfile, ensure database is ready 
 Start the secret data area from directory /var/postgresql/secret-data 
cd /var/postgresql/secret_data 
pg_ctl start -D /var/postgresql/secret_data -l logfile 
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Check the logfile, ensure the database is ready 
*End Functional Test* 
6. Create the snort databases for each sensor 
 As the user postgres create the user snort for each data area 
createuser -p 5433 snort 
Select yes to create databases and no to create other users 
createuser -p 5434 snort 
Select yes to create databases and no to create other users 
Alter snort’s database password for unclass_data 
 psql -p 5433 -U postgres -d template1 
 alter user snort password ‘mysea’; 
 \q 
Alter snort’s database password for secret_data 
 psql -p 5434 -U postgres -d template1 
 alter user snort password ‘mysea’; 
 \q 
Create the snort databases 
 su - snort 
 createdb -p 5433 snort 
 createdb -p 5434 snort 
 Update the schema for each database. Obtain the create_postgresql file 
from CD1 /snort-2.8.0.1/create_postgresql and copy to a temporary directory. 
Change to the directory containing ‘create_postgresql’ file 
 psql -p 5433 < ./create_postgresql  
 psql -p 5434 < ./create_postgresql 
*Functional Test* 
7. If the sensors have been completed:  
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Login from sensor IDS1 
psql -h 192.168.100.3 -p 5433 -U snort -d snort  
Enter password 
Run a query 
select * from event; 
Should get 0 rows. 
\q 
NOTE: If the output is, access denied the database is not owned by snort 
Login from sensor IDS2 
psql -h 192.168.101.3 -p 5434 -U snort -d snort 
Enter password 
Run a query 
select * from event; 
Should get 0 rows. 
\q 
NOTE: If the output is, access denied the database is not owned by the 
user snort  
Exit from all of the shells to get back to the root user but leave both 
databases running. 
*End Functional Test* 
D. INSTALLING BASE ON RED HAT 8 
This section covers installing the web application BASE, along with 
required software programs Apache and PHP.  Perform the following procedures 
as root 
 87
1. Apache Installation 
1. Install Apache 1.3.0 from CD1. Copy apache_1.3.0.tar.tar from CD 1 
/apache-1.3.0 to /usr/local/src 
 cd /usr/local/src 
 tar -xvzf apache_1.3.0.tar.tar 
 cd /apache_1.3.0 
NOTE: To use PHP with Apache, Apache needs to be compiled with 
mod_so support. 
 ./configure --enable-module=so 
 make 
 make install 
<observe: the banner "You now have successfully built and installed the 
Apache 1.3..." box> 
2. Edit httpd.conf 
Edit httpd.conf located at /usr/local/apache/etc 
Change ServerName to be localhost or IP address of the machine 
3. Starting and Stopping apache server 
start apache:/usr/local/apache/sbin/apachectl start 
stop apache: /usr/local/apache/sbin/apachectl stop 
*Functional Test* 
4. Test the server 
Start the apache server: 
/usr/local/apache/sbin/apachectl start 
Using a web browser that can access the RH8 server browse to 
http://192.168.100.3 or whatever IP address is used by RH8. 
<Observe: The "It Worked!" home page should be displayed> 
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5. Verify requirements for installing php4 
 /usr/local/apache/sbin/httpd -l 
Look for two modules: http_core.c and mod_so.c 
If they are present proceed to INSTALL PHP4 otherwise troubleshoot why 
the modules were not compiled. 
2. PHP4.3.11 Installation 
1. Install PHP 4.3.11 from CD1 
OPTIONAL: If you want graphic support for BASE, i.e., graphs and charts, 
perform the following installation procedures: 
Copy all of the files from CD1 /php-4.3.11/GD support to /usr/local/src and 
install them using the rpm package installer. 
rpm -U libpng-1.2.2-8.i386.rpm 
rpm -iv libpng-devel-1.2.2-8.i386.rpm 
rpm -iv libjpeg-devel-6b-21.i386.rpm 
rpm -iv zlib-1.1.4-4.i386.rpm 
rpm -iv zlib-devel-1.1.4-4.i386.rpm 
Copy php-4.3.11.tar.tar from CD1 /php-4.3.11 to /usr/local/src 
tar -xvzf php-4.3.11.tar.tar 
cd php4.3.11 
./configure --with-apxs=/usr/local/apache/sbin/apxs --
with-pear --with-pgsql=/usr/local/pgsql --with-gd --with-
png-dir=/usr/lib --with-jpeg-dir=/usr/lib --with-zlib-
dir=/usr/include 
NOTE: this is with graphics support. If you do not want graphics support 
(GD) them omit everything after --with-gd 
 make 
 make install 
NOTE: ignore the suggestion about adding the path to the php.ini file  
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2. Post Installation 
 Edit /usr/local/apache/etc/httpd.conf 
 Add the following to the end of the file 
 #AddType directives for php 4.3.1 
 AddType application/x-httpd-php .php .phtml 
 AddType application/x-httpd-php-source .phps 
Restart apache: 
 /usr/local/apache/sbin/apachectl restart 
*Functional Test* 
Create a test script called phpinfo.php 
  <? phpinfo() ?> 
Save phpinfo.php and place in apache's document root 
cp phpinfo.php /usr/local/apache/share/htdocs 
Browse to http://192.168.100.3/phpinfo.php 
<observe: a web page that displays php information> 
*End Functional Test* 
Optional install for making Charts and Graphs in BASE 
If PHP was compiled with GD support perform the following: 
1. Copy all files from CD1 /php-4.3.11/pear to /usr/local/src 
 cd /usr/local/src 
2. Run the command: pear config-set preferred_state alpha 
3. Install the following packages in order 
 pear install Image_Color-1.0.2.tar 
 pear install Image_Canvas-0.3.0.tar 
 pear install Image_Graph-0.7.2.tar 
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 pear install Numbers_Roman-1.0.1.tar 
 pear install Numbers_Words-0.14.0.tar 
3. BASE (Basic Analysis Security Engine) Installation 
1. Install ADOdb.  Copy adodb498.gz from CD1/base-1.4.0 to /usr/local/ 
 tar -xvzf adodb498.gz 
 <observe: new directory adodb created with files> 
NOTE: There is nothing to install but remember this location for 
configuring BASE 
4. Unclassified BASE Installation 
NOTE: verify the unclass database snort is running before performing 
these procedures 
1. Copy base 1.4.0.tar.gz from CD1 to /usr/local/apache/share/htdocs 
cd /usr/local/apache/share/htdocs 
tar -xvzf base-1.4.0.tar.gz 
2. Rename directory base-1.4.0 to base_unclass:  
mv base-1.4.0 base_unclass 
3. Set read/write/execute on directory base_unclass 
chmod 777 base_unclass 
2. Open a web browser and browse 
 to http://192.168.100.3/base_unclass/setup/indiex.php 
  <Observe: web page with banner and Settings: 
 Configurable writing: yes 
 Php version: 4.3.11 
 Php logging level: <blank> 
5. Step 1 of 5 
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Enter the location to adodb: /usr/local/adodb 
6. Step 2 of 5 
Enter the applicable information 
 Pick a Database type: PostGRES 
 Database name: snort 
 Database host: 192.168.100.3 
 Database port: 5433 
 Database user name: snort 
 Database password: mysea 
 Leave the Archive Database items blank 
 Click Submit Query 
7. Step 3 of 5 
Click the box next to Use Authentication System 
 Admin user name: snort 
 Password: mysea 
 Full name: snort 
 NOTE: Any name can be used 
 Click on Submit Query 
8. Step 4 of 5 
Click on Create BASE AG button to extend the snort database 
Verify all tables were successfully created and roles inserted 
Click on the link Now continue to step 5 ... (middle of the page) 
9. Login as snort password mysea.  
<Ignore the error about user not existing> 
10. Reset the attributes on the base_unclass directory  
chmod 755 base_unclass 
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11. Cosmetic change: Change style sheets so all banners display the 
word “UNCLASS” at the top of each page. 
 cd /usr/local/apache/share/htdocs/base_unclass/languages 
 Edit english.lang.php 
 Search for _TITLE 
 Add the word UNCLASS before and after the title in single quotes 
12. Bug fix: Fixes fatal error when log out link is clicked.  
 cd /usr/local/apache/share/htdocs/base_unclass 
 Open the base_logout.php file in a text editor 
 Change ‘base_header()’ function to ‘header()’ 
 Keep all text inside the parentheses 
 Save the file 
NOTE: If you did the IDS testing then you should see some alert data in 
the database. 
5. Secret BASE Installation 
NOTE: verify the secret database snort is running before performing these 
procedures 
1. Return to the htdocs directory and untar base 
cd /usr/local/apache/share/htdocs 
tar -xvzf base-1.4.0.tar.gz 
2. Rename directory base-1.4.0 to base_secret:  
mv base-1.4.0 base_secret 
3.  Change read/write/execute attributes on directory base_secret 
chmod 777 base_secret 
4. Open a web browser and browse 
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 to: http://192.168.101.3/base_secret/index.php 
 <Observe: web page with banner and Settings: 
 Configurable writing: yes 
 Php version: 4.3.11 
 Php logging level: <blank> 
5. Step 1 of 5 
Enter the location to adodb: /usr/local/adodb 
6. Step 2 of 5 
Enter the applicable information 
 Pick a Database type: PostGRES 
 Database name: snort 
 Database host: 192.168.101.3 
 Database port: 5434 
 Database user name: snort 
 Database password: mysea 
 Leave the Archive Database items blank 
 Click Submit Query 
7. Step 3 of 5 
Click the box next to Use Authentication System 
 Admin user name: snort 
 password: mysea 
 full name: snort 
 NOTE: Any name can be used 
 Click on Submit Query 
8. Step 4 of 5 
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Click on Create BASE AG button to extend the snort database 
Verify all tables were successfully created and roles inserted 
Click on the link Now continue to step 5 ... (middle of the page) 
9. Login as snort password mysea.  
<Ignore the error about user not existing> 
10. Reset the attributes on directory base_secret 
 chmod 755 base_secret 
11. Cosmetic change: Change style sheets so all banners display the 
word “SECRET” at the top of each page. 
cd /usr/local/apache/share/htdocs/base_secret/languages 
 Edit english.lang.php 
 Search for _TITLE 
 Add the word SECRET before and after the title in single quotes 
12. Bug fix: Fixes fatal error when log out link is clicked. 
cd /usr/local/apache/share/htdocs/base_secret 
Open the base_logout.php file in a text editor 
 Change ‘base_header()’ function to ‘header()’ 
 Keep all text inside the parentheses 
 Save the file 
NOTE: If you did the IDS testing then you should see some alert data in 
the database. 
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APPENDIX B XTS400 INSTALLATION PROCEDURES 
This appendix outlines the installation procedures for the IDS on a Debian 
4.0 operating system and installing PostgreSQL and Basic Analysis Security 
Engine (BASE) on the STOP 6.3 operating system. 
A. INSTALLATION AND TEST TOPOLOGY 
The test topology is comprised of three physical machines and two Virtual 
Machines. One of the physical machines is the XTS400 server that runs the 
STOP 6.3 operating system. The diagram above the server shows the layout of 
the 4-port network interface card mounted in the PCI bus at the rear of the 
machine. This is important to information to keep in mind when setting up the test 
network and configuring the Ethernet cards. Figure 14 shows the lab layout. 
 
Figure 14: Lab Setup 
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Installing the desktop operating system, Red Hat 8, VMWare, and 
configuring VMWare workstation is beyond the scope of this project. 
1. Conventions used in this Documentation 
All commands that need to be typed at the command prompt are italicized 
and in Courier New font. All items are typed into a configuration file are in 
Courier New font. 
B. INSTALLING SNORT ON DEBIAN 4.0 
This section covers installing the Linux Operating System, Snort, and 
other programs required to support Snort. 
1. Debian Operating System Installation 
1. Insert Debian DVD-1 and boot up the PC 
2. Select english for language 
3. Select United States for country 
4. Select American English for keymap 
5. DO NOT USE DHCP, configure the network manually 
Enter the following information (refer to lab diagram for IP addresses) 
 IP: IDS1 - 192.168.100.10 IDS2 - 192.168.101.10 
 Net Mask: For both IDS - 255.255.255.0 
 Gateway: <leave blank> 
 DNS server: <leave blank> 
6. Enter a hostname: For IDS1 - IDS1 For IDS2 - IDS2 
7. Enter domain name: <leave blank> 
8. Partition Disk 
 Select Guided - use entire disk 
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 Partitioning scheme - select Separate /home, /usr, /var, and /tmp 
partitions 
Install will compute partition space. Select Finish partitioning and write 
changes to disk then yes to commit changes 
9. Configure time zone, set for PST 
10. Set root's password 
11. Add a user and password 
12. Install will set up base system 
13. Select no for network mirror, all software should be installed from one 
of the three DVDs or from CD1 
14. Select no to participate in package survey 
15. Software selection 
Unselect Desktop environment 
Unselect Standard system.  
16. Select Yes to install GRUB boot loader to the master boot record 
17. Reboot into the finished system 
2. Support Software Installation 
Use apt-get install to install software. 
Example lets install ssh so a ssh terminal can be used if needed. 
1. apt-get install ssh 
2. Install the following packages from DVD-1. These will be required for 
installing libpcap and snort. 
 gcc g++ make postgresql-client flex bison libpcre3 libpcre3-dev  
 libpq-dev  
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apt-get install gcc g++ make postgresql-client flex 
bison libpcre3 libpcre3-dev libpq-dev 
3. Libpcap0.9.8 Installation 
1. Use libpcap0.9.8.tar.gz file provided on CD1 /snort-2.8.0.1 
2. Copy tar file to /usr/local/src 
 cd /usr/local/src 
 tar –xvzf libpcap-0.9.8.tar.gz 
 cd libpcap-0.9.8 
 ./configure 
 make 
 make install 
4. Snort Installation 
1. Use the snort tar file provided on CD1 /snort-2.8.0.1 
2. Copy tar file to /usr/local/src 
 cd /usr/local/src 
 tar –xvf snort-2.8.0.1.tar 
 cd snort-2.8.0.1 
./configure --with-postgresql --enable-dynamicplugin 
 make 
 make install 
 mkdir /etc/snort 
 mkdir /var/log/snort 
 groupadd snort 
 useradd –g snort snort 
 chown snort:snort /var/log/snort 
5. Snort Rules Installation 
1. Use the snort rules tar file provided on CD1 /snort-2.8.0.1 
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2. Copy the rules tarball to /etc/snort 
cd /etc/snort  
tar –xvzf snortrules-snapshot-CURRENT.tar.gz 
 cp /usr/local/src/snort-2.8.0.1/etc/*.conf* /etc/snort 
 cp /usr/local/src/snort-2.8.0.1/etc/*.map  /etc/snort 
3. Configure the snort.conf file at /etc/snot/snot.conf. Change the following 
lines less the quotes: 
‘var HOME_NET any’ change to: 
‘var HOME_NET 192.168.100.0/24’ #for IDS1 
‘var HOME_NET 192.168.101.0/24’ #for IDS2 
‘var EXTERNAL_NET any’ change to: 
‘var EXTERNAL_NET !$HOME_NET’ 
Search on the string ‘var RULE_PATH’ 
Change the line to 
‘var RULE_PATH /etc/snort/rules’ 
*Functional Test* 
1. Start snort with the following command 
snort –D –u snort –g snort –c /etc/snort/snort.conf 
2. Check that eth0 enters promiscuous mode 
3. Check /var/log/syslog for Snort initialization completed successfully 
(pid=some number) 
tail -f /var/log/syslog 
4. Run a portscan on the IDS using nmap or any available port scanner. 
check /var/log/snort/alerts for a portscan priority 3 message 
tail -f /var/log/snort/alerts 
5. If snort works then kill the snort process and continue 
*End Functional Test* 
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6. Finalize Sensor Installation 
Change configuration file and send alerts to XTS400  
STOP! 
NOTE: Before proceeding with these steps, perform the installation 
procedures for PostgreSQL including setting up the schema for the snort 
database. 
*Functional Test* 
1. Run the following command:  
psql -h 192.168.100.130  -U snort -d snort 
NOTE: The IP address will vary according to your network configuration 
2. <Observe: should get a snort=> prompt. Exit from psql with \q 
*End Functional Test* 
3. Edit snort.conf to send all alerts to the PostgreSQL database 
 cd /etc/snort 
 edit snort.conf 
 page down to Step #4: Configure output plugins 
 find the line # output database: alert, postgresql… 
 NOTE: search for postgresql with your editor’s search feature 
 Configure the parameters so line looks like this: 
output database: log, postgresql, user=snort 
dbname=snort port=5433 host=192.168.100.130 
NOTE: your parameters will vary based on your network settings and port 
settings 
 Unclassified Postgresql database: port 5433 
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 Secret Postgresql database: port 5434 
*Functional Test* 
4. Start snort and check that it initialized correctly: 
snort –D –u snort –g snort –c /etc/snort/snort.conf 
tail –f /var/log/syslog 
5. Repeat the portscan test. This time the alert should go to the 
PostgreSQL database. 
Login to the PostgreSQL database either remotely from the IDS or locally 
on the database server. 
 snort=> select * from event; 
 snort=> select * from signature; 
Depending on the port scanner used there may be one or two events and 
one or two signatures 
*End Functional Test* 
7. Lokkit Firewall Installation 
To give the sensor some protection install a simple iptables based firewall 
called lokkit 
1. Copy lokkit_0.50.22-7.1_i386.deb from CD1 /misc to /usr/local/src 
dpkg –i lokkit lokkit_0.50.22-7.1_i386.deb 
2. Run the command lokkit 
3. Choose medium and customize 
Allow port 22 for SSH and the port for the PostgreSQL database you wish 
to send alerts to. The database port must be added for two-way communication 
between database server and IDS. 
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C. XTS400 NETWORK SETUP 
This section covers setting up the XTS400 to place two network ports into 
different security classifications so the IDS can communicate with the 
PostgreSQL databases. In future work all of the network ports will run at 
maximum security level. 
For this experiment to succeed the following Ethernet ports must be 
changed to allow the IDS to communicate with the PostgreSQL database. 
Device /dev/ether1 (sl1:il0) 
Device /dev/ether2 (sl5 sc1:il0) 
See lab diagram. 
Conventions used in this documentation: 
For the XTS400 setup documentation all security and integrity levels are in 
bold Arial font and are given as security first then integrity: 
Example: sl0:il0 
Means security level 0 integrity level 0 
Example: min:oss 
Means: lowest possible security level with integrity level set to il3 with all 
categories enabled. 
<CR> mean carriage return, press the Enter key on the keyboard 
1. Configure TCP/IP Parameters for Ether1 and Ether2 
NOTE: IP addresses used below are from the Snort MLS testbed 
configuration, modify as necessary to reflect current topology but it is 
recommended to use these IP addresses for now. 
Login as admin 
Set security and integrity levels - min:max 
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SAK 
Enter command?     tcpip_edit 
Enter editor request?   add 
Enter TCP/IP daemon name?  tcpip_unclass 
Enter TCPIP/IP daemon description? Unclass TCP/IP connection 
  
Enter domain name?   <CR> 
Enter host name?    mlsserver 
Will this daemon support IPv4?   Y 
Will this daemon support IPv6?   <CR> 
Treat all subnets in network as local[N]  <CR> 
Shutdown on failure[N]    <CR> 
Use default TCP minimum retransmission timeout[Y] <CR> 
Enable IPv4 forwarding[N]    <CR> 
Send IPv4 redirects[Y]    <CR> 
Forward IPv4 source routed packets[N]  <CR> 
Accept IPv4 source routed packets[N]  <CR> 
Drop ICMP4 redirects[Y]    <CR> 
Reply to ICMP4 netmask requests[N}  <CR> 
Use randomly generated IPv4 datagram IDs[N] <CR> 
Add the network interface configuration[Y] <CR> 
Enter TCP/IP device name?   /dev/ether1 
Is IPv4 active on this interface?[Y]  <CR> 
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Enter the IPv4 address in the format A.B.C.D  192.168.100.130 
Enter the IPv4 network mask in the format A.B.C.D 255.255.255.0 
Use default IPv4 broadcast address?[Y]  <CR> 
<observe: Network interface /dev/ether1 added.> 
Add another network interface entry[N]  N 
NOTE: this is the interface for the other IDS on the secret network 
/dev/ether2 
add 
Enter TCP/IP daemon name?                   tcpip_secret 
Enter TCPIP/IP daemon description? Secret TCP/IP connection  
Enter domain name?                             <CR> 
Enter host name?                                mlsserver 
Will this daemon support IPv4?   Y 
Will this daemon support IPv6?   <CR> 
Treat all subnets in network as local[N]  <CR> 
Shutdown on failure[N]    <CR> 
Use default TCP minimum retransmission timeout[Y] <CR> 
Enable IPv4 forwarding[N]    <CR> 
Send IPv4 redirects[Y]    <CR> 
Forward IPv4 source routed packets[N]  <CR> 
Accept IPv4 source routed packets[N]  <CR> 
Drop ICMP4 redirects[Y]    <CR> 
Reply to ICMP4 netmask requests[N}  <CR> 
Use randomly generated IPv4 datagram IDs[N] <CR> 
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Add the network interface configuration[Y] <CR> 
Enter TCP/IP device name?   /dev/ether2 
Is IPv4 active on this interface?[Y]  <CR> 
Enter the IPv4 address in the format A.B.C.D  192.168.101.130 
Enter the IPv4 network mask in the format A.B.C.D 255.255.255.0 
Use default IPv4 broadcast address?[Y]  <CR> 
<observe: Network interface /dev/ether1 added.> 
Add another network interface entry[N]  N 
Add the route configuration[N]   <CR> 
Add the resolver configuration[N]   <CR> 
<observe: TCP/IP Daemon tcp_unclass added and tcp_secret added> 
exit 
NOTE: remove all references in the tcpip_mls to all Ethernet devices 
except /dev/ether0 
2. Configure the Daemon for tcp_unclass and tcp_secret 
SAK - level should still be min:max 
Enter command?      daemon_edit 
Enter editor request?    add 
Enter daemon name?    tcpip_unclass 
Enter the command line for the daemon program? tcpip 
Enter the arguments for the program?  <CR> 
Enter daemon environment setting?  <CR> 
Start daemon at startup?    Y 
Is the daemon a High Integrity program file? Y 
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Will this daemon control a device ?  N 
Enter daemon security level and categories sl1 
Enter daemon integrity level and categories il0 
Use default daemon priority [-1]   <CR> 
Enter user name?     network 
Enter group name?     network 
Display current starting order before setting start index[N] <CR> 
Enter daemon start index?    2  
 NOTE:, tcpip daemons must start first so if there are other daemons put 
the tcpip daemon at the beginning of the order before other non tcpip daemons 
Enter the delay interval in seconds before starting the daemon? 0 
Enter the delay interval in seconds while stopping the daemon? 0 
Enter daemon description? TCP_IP daemon for unclassified IDS 
<observe: Daemon entry added. 
NOTE: repeat the process to add a daemon for the tcp_secret network 
Enter editor request?    add 
Enter daemon name?    tcpip_secret 
Enter the command line for the daemon program? tcpip 
Enter the arguments for the program?  <CR> 
Enter daemon environment setting?  <CR> 
Start daemon at startup?    Y 
Is the daemon a High Integrity program file? Y 
Will this daemon control a device ?  N 
Enter daemon security level and categories sl5 sc1 
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Enter daemon integrity level and categories il0 
Use default daemon priority [-1]   <CR> 
Enter user name?    network 
Enter group name?    network 
Display current starting order before setting start index[N] <CR> 
Enter daemon start index?    3  
NOTE:, tcpip daemons must start first so if there are other daemons put 
the tcpip daemon at the beginning of the order before other non tcpip daemons 
Enter the delay interval in seconds before starting the daemon? 0 
Enter the delay interval in seconds while stopping the daemon? 0 
Enter daemon description? TCP_IP daemon for secret IDS 
<observe: Daemon entry added. 
exit 
3. Configure the device (SDA) for /dev/ether1 and /dev/ether2 
NOTE: change security and integrity level to max:max 
SAK 
Enter command?      sda 
Enter device?      /dev/ether1 
Enter new device security level and categories? sl1 
   Enter new device integrity level and categories? il0 
   Modify discretionary access?    Y 
   Enter device modes for owner?    rw 
   Enter user name for specific permission?  <CR> 
   Enter device modes for group?    rw 
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   Enter group name for specific permission?  <CR> 
   Enter device modes for others?    rw 
       (VERIFY user & group is SYSTEM) 
   Is access correct?      Y 
NOTE: repeat for device /dev/ether2 
SAK 
Enter command?      sda 
Enter device?      /dev/ether2 
Enter new device security level and categories? sl5 sc1 
   Enter new device integrity level and categories? il0 
   Modify discretionary access?    Y 
   Enter device modes for owner?                        rw 
   Enter user name for specific permission?         <CR> 
   Enter device modes for group?                       rw 
   Enter group name for specific permission?         <CR> 
   Enter device modes for others?                       rw 
       (VERIFY user & group is SYSTEM) 
   Is access correct?                                    <CR> 
NOTE: If ‘startup’ has been performed then proceed to step 4 to start the 
daemons. If the tcpip_mls daemon was modified then restart that daemon before 
proceeding to step 4. 
4. Start the daemons 
SAK 
Enter command?      start_daemon 
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Enter daemon name?     tcpip_unclass 
<observe: daemon started successfully> 
Enter daemon name?     tcpip_secret 
<observe: daemon started successfully> 
Enter daemon name?     <CR> 
<observe: Start_daemon complete> 
*Functional Test* 
5. Testing IP interfaces. 
Set security and integrity level to sl1:il0 
SAK 
run 
At command prompt type: ifconfig 
<observe: lo0 inet addr 127.0.0.1 netmask 255.0.0.0 
/dev/ether1 inet addr 192.168.100.130 netmask 255.255.255.0 
Repeat for security and integrity level of sl5 sc1:il0 
*End Functional Test* 
D. INSTALLING POSTGRESQL 7.4.18 ON STOP 6.3 
This section will cover installing the open source database PostgreSQL 
version 7.4.18 on the STOP 6.3 operating system. Three data areas will be 
initialized, one just for regular testing, one data area for Snort’s unclassified 
database and one data area for Snort’s secret database. 
Postgres 7.4.18 Pre-Installation Instructions 
To operate Postgresql and installed databases for the Snort sensors two 
users need to be created.  User postgres will run the postmaster database 
process. User snort is required to make the database snort. Postgres 7.4.18 
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does not have a function to give ownership to an entire database, only tables. In 
order for the remote user snort coming in from the snort sensor to utilize the 
database the user snort must make the database snort. 
NOTE: copying files from CD to the STOP 6.3 file system requires the use of the 
‘cdtool’. An example of using the cdtool is: 
 cdtool cp /dev/cdrom /postgresql-7.4.18/postgresql-
7.4.18.tar.gz /usr/local/src/postgresql-7.4.18.tar.gz 
1. Create Groups Named Postgres and Snort 
Perform the following steps as admin at (max:max) 
SAK 
Enter command?    ga_edit 
?      add 
Enter group name?    postgres 
Enter group number (1 - X)  NOTE: Use the last number 
Enter user list request (a, d, l or q) q 
<Observe: Group entry added 
*Repeat steps starting with ‘add’ for group snort 
exit 
2. Create Users Named Postgres and Snort 
Perform the following steps as admin with applicable security and integrity 
levels to run the ua_edit process. (max:max) 
NOTE: The function of user ‘postgres’ is to own the postmaster process and the 
database areas. The function of user snort is to create the snort databases. 
Neither user needs to have the capabilities to remotely logon to the XTS400 via 
the TPE therefore, they should not be entire setup as normal users. 
SAK 
Enter command?     ua_edit 
       add 
 Enter user name?    postgres 
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 Enter user number?    Select the next available number 
 Enter default group?   postgres 
 Add user to group?    Y 
 Enter command processor?  /bin/sh 
 Enter home directory?   /home/postgres 
 Enter user max security level and categories? max 
 Enter user max integrity level and categories? max 
 Enter user default security level and categories:min 
 Enter user default integrity level and categories: oss 
 Down grade allowed?    n 
 Upgrade allowed?     n 
 View optional when downgrading?  n 
 Change user password allowed?   y 
 Disconnect allowed?    y 
 Kill, ikill allowed?     y 
 Run allowed?     y 
 Set group allowed?     n 
 Set level, change default level allowed?  y 
 Shutdown allowed?     n 
 Unmarked printed output allowed?  n 
 multiple logins allowed?    y 
 change other users' passwords allowed? n 
 repeat ua_edit and create a user called snort with group snort and home= 
/home/snort. Duplicate the other settings 
Change the password of each user using the cup command 
SAK 
Enter command? cup 
Enter user name? postgres 
Force user to change password at next authentication [N] <CR> 
NOTE: Password length must be 6 - 16 characters in length and contain 
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numerals and special characters. 
Enter new user password?  xts400 
Enter new user password again?  xts400 
<Observe: User password changed 
Repeat for user snort. 
exit 
After making the groups and users the group and passwd file needs to be 
updated. 
Set security and integrity level: min:oss 
SAK 
Enter command? run, or reattach to previous session at min:oss 
From the shell prompt run the following commands: 
/xts/untrusted/bin/xtsmkgroup > /etc/group 
chmod 644 /etc/group 
/xts/untrusted/bin/xtsmkpasswd > /etc/passwd 
chmod 644 /etc/passwd 
3. PostgreSQL 7.4.18 Installation 
Perform following steps as admin at level (min:oss) 
1. Make directory /usr/local/src 
 mkdir /usr/local/src 
 cd /usr/local/src 
2. Copy postgresql-base-7.4.18.tar.gz from CD1 /postgresql-7.4.18  to 
/usr/local/src 
cdtool cp /dev/cdrom /postgres-7.4.18/postgresql-base-
7.4.18.tar.gz /usr/local/src/postgresql-7.4.18.tar.gz 
tar -xvzf /usr/local/src/postgresql-base-7.4.18.tar.gz  
cd /usr/local/src/postgresql-7.4.18 
NOTE: Compiling Postgresql requires gmake > 3.76.1 
 gmake --version = 3.8 on XTS400 
  ISO/ANSI C compiler such as GCC  
3. Run configure script 
  ./configure --without-readline --without-zlib 
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 NOTE: default installation is /usr/local/pgsql 
 All other files install to sub-directories under /pgsql 
 Use ./configure --help for other alternatives 
NOTE: As of this installation <5/10/2008> STOP 6.3.1 did not have 
readline library or zlib library installed, thus reason for the extra 
parameters for the ./configure command  
NOTE: ignore the errors related to Flex and Bison, they are only required 
if building from CVS or changing any of the scanner definition files. 
4. Start build with gmake: 
 gmake 
<Observe: final output is "All of PostgreSQL successfully made. Ready to 
install"> 
5. (optional) Regression Tests: 
 as a non-privileged user: 
 gmake check  
6. Install the files: 
 gmake install 
<Observe: PostgreSQL installation complete> 
4. Post-installation Setup 
Perform as user admin level (min:oss) 
1. Update Environment Variables 
 add to /etc/profile 
 PATH=/usr/local/pgsql/bin:$PATH
 MANPATH=/usr/local/pgsql/man:$MANPATH 
2. Initialize a database storage area on disk:  
NOTE: this storage area will be at min:oss   
 mkdir /usr/local/pgsql/data  
 chown postgres /usr/local/pgsql/data  
 Log out of XTS400 as admin and log in as postgres 
 Start untrusted environment at min:oss 
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 SAK  
 run  
 initdb -D /usr/local/pgsql/data  
<Observe:  
initdb -D /usr/local/pgsql/data… 
> 
3. Starting and stopping the database server as user postgres:  
 Use the pg_ctl script as user postgres to start the databases 
 type pg_ctl --help for options 
Start: pg_ctl start -D  /usr/local/pgsql/data -l serverlog 
Stop: pg_ctl stop -D /usr/local/pgsql/data -m fast 
*Functional Test* 
4. Test the installation by making a database called mydb then login as postgres. 
Postgressql 7.4.18 requries logging in with username and database unless the 
database is the same name as the user. 
 cd /usr/local/pgsql/data 
 pg_ctl start -D /usr/local/pgsql/data -l logfile 
 createdb mydb 
 psql -U postgres -d mydb 
 use \q to quit 
Stop the database:  
 pg_ctl stop –D /usr/local/pgsql/data –m fast 
Logout from the untrusted environment 
Logout as postgres 
This completes setting up postgresql to run at level min:oss 
5. Configure PostgreSQL to Operate at Multiple Security Levels 
 Perform the following steps as admin unless noted. 
1. Create two data locations for starting up two more instances of PostgreSQL 
 Set security and integrity levels - min:max 
 SAK 
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 Enter command?    fsm 
     mkdir 
 Enter the directory to create?  /var/postgresql 
 Should this be a deflection directory [N]  <CR> 
 <Observe: Directory added 
      change 
 Enter pathname?     /var/postgresql 
 Modify access level [N]?     Y 
 Enter new object security level and categories?  sl0 
 Enter new object integrity level and categories?  il3 
 Is the level correct [Y]     <CR> 
 Modify discretionary access [N]    Y 
 Enter new owner name?     admin 
 Enter new group name?     stop 
 Enter object modes for owner?    rwx 
 Enter user name for specific permission?   postgres 
 Enter object modes for specific user?   rx 
 Enter user name for specific permission?   snort 
 Enter object modes for specific user?   rx 
 Enter user name for specific permission?   <CR> 
 Enter object modes for group?    <CR> 
 Enter group name for specific permission?   <CR> 
 Enter object modes for others?    <CR> 
 Display the object [N]     <CR> 
 Okay to change [Y]     <CR> 
NOTE: User postgres and snort should have rx access to /var/postgresql 
  
       mkdir 
 Enter the directory to create? /var/postgresql/unclass_data 
 Should this be a deflection directory [N]   <CR> 
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 <Observe: Directory created>  
       change 
 Enter pathname?  /var/postgresql/unclass_data 
 Modify access level?     Y 
 Enter new object security level and categories?  sl1 
 Enter new object integrity level and categories?  il0 
 Is the level correct [Y]     <CR>  
 Modify discetionary access [N]    Y 
 Enter new owner name?     postgres 
 Enter new group name?     postgres 
 Enter object modes for owner?    rwx 
 Enter user name for specific permission?   snort 
 Enter object modes for specific user?   rwx 
  Enter user name for specific permission?   admin  
 Enter object modes for specific user?   rwx 
 Enter user name for specific permission   <CR>  
 Enter object modes for group?    <CR> 
 Enter group name for specific permission?   <CR> 
 Enter object modes for others?    <CR> 
 Display the object [N]     <CR> 
 Okay to change [Y]     <CR> 
 NOTE: only users postgres, snort, and admin should have rwx access 
 Access changed  
       mkdir 
 Enter the directory to create?  /var/postgresql/secret_data 
 Should this be a deflection directory[N]   <CR> 
       change 
 Enter pathname?  /var/postgresql/secret_data  
 Modify access level?     Y 
 Enter new object security level and categories?  sl5 sc1 
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 Enter new object integrity level and categories?  il0 
 Is the level correct [Y]     <CR>  
 Modify discetionary access [N]    Y 
 Enter new owner name?     postgres 
 Enter new group name?     postgres 
 Enter object modes for owner?   rwx 
 Enter user name for specific permission?  snort 
 Enter object modes for specific user?   rwx 
 Enter user name for specific permission?   admin 
 Enter object modes for specific user?   rwx 
 Enter user name for specific permission   <CR>  
 Enter object modes for group?    <CR> 
 Enter group name for specific permission?   <CR> 
 Enter object modes for others?    <CR> 
 Display the object [N]     <CR> 
 Okay to change [Y]     <CR> 
 NOTE: only users postgres, snort, and admin should have rwx access 
 Access changed 
 exit 
 logout admin 
2. Initialize the database areas 
 Log into XTS400 as user postgres 
 Set security and integrity levels to sl1:il0 
 SAK  
 run 
 cd /var/postgresql/unclass_data 
 initdb -D /var/postgresql/unclass_data 
 <Observe that the output is the same as step 2 Post-Installation Setup 
 Run command ls 
 <Observe that files and directories were created> 
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 Edit postgresql.conf 
Remove # from line tcpip_socket = false and change the line to 
read: tcpip_socket = true 
 Remove # from line port = 5432 and change the line to read 
   port = 5433 
 Save the file 
 Edit pg_hba.conf 
 Page down to the end of the file 
Remove the IPv6 and local host entries NOTE: The MYSEA host file 
does not use local host entries and localhost is not required. 
 Append the following to the proper headers: 
 TYPE  host  
 DATABASE snort  
 USER  snort  
 IP_ADDRESS 192.168.100.0 
 MASK  255.255.255.0 
 AUTH_TYPE MD5 
 Save the file 
 Start the database 
pg_ctl start -D /var/postgresql/unclass_data -l 
logfile 
Create the PostgreSQL database user snort so XTS400 user snort can 
create the database snort 
 Run the script createuser -p 5433 snort 
 Shall the new user be allowed to create databases?   y 
 Shall the new user be allowed to create more new users?  n 
 <Observe: CREATE USER> 
 Alter user snort’s database password 
 psql -p 5433 -U postgres -d template1 
 alter user snort password ‘mysea’; 
 \q 
 Stop the database 
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 pg_ctl stop -D /var/postgresql/unclass_data -m fast 
  
 ***REPEAT for data area /var/postgresql/secret_data*** 
 Log out of session 
 Change security and integrity levels to sl5 sc1:il0 
 SAK  
 run 
 cd /var/postgresql/secret_data 
 initdb -D /var/postgresql/secret_data 
<Observe that the output is the same as step 2 Post-Installation Setup 
 Run command ls 
 <Observe that files and directories were created> 
 Edit postgresql.conf 
Remove # from line tcpip_socket = false and change the line to read 
tcpip_socket = true 
 Remove # from line port = 5432 and change the line to read 
   port = 5434 
 Save the file 
 Edit pg_hba.conf 
 Page down to the end of the file 
Remove the IPv6 and localhost enteries. NOTE: The MYSEA host file 
does not use local host entries and localhost is not required.  
 Append the following entries to the proper headers 
 TYPE  host 
 DATABASE snort 
 USER  snort 
 IP_ADDRESS 192.168.101.0 
 MASK  255.255.255.0 
 AUTH_TYPE MD5 
 Save the file 
 Start the database 
pg_ctl start -D /var/postgresql/secret_data -l 
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logfile 
Create the postgresql database user snort so XTS400 user snort can 
create the database snort. 
 Run the script createuser -p 5434 snort 
 Shall the new user be allowed to create databases?   y 
 Shall the new user be allowed to create more new users?  n 
 <Observe: CREATE USER> 
 Alter user snort’s password 
 psql -p 5433 -U postgres -d template1 
 alter user snort password ‘mysea’; 
 \q  
 Stop the database 
 pg_ctl stop -D /var/postgresql/secret_data -m fast 
3. Create two daemons for starting the new postgresql database areas 
 log user postgres out of the system 
 log into XTS as admin 
 set security and integrity levels - min:max 
 SAK 
 Enter command?    tp_edit 
 type in cd then then enter to change to /system directory 
      add 
 Enter program name?    pg_ctl 
 Enter pathname?   
 /usr/local/pgsql/bin/pg_ctl 
 Enter maximum integrity?    <CR> 
 Enter minimum integrity?    <CR> 
 Assign privileges [N]    Y 
 Only assign Y to the following options: 
  Enable "Set owner/group" privilege 
 Modify discretionary access [N]    Y 
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 Enter new owner name?     postgres 
 Enter new group name?     postgres 
 Enter object modes for owner?    rwx 
 Enter user name for specific permission?   snort 
 Enter object modes for user?    rwx 
 Enter group name for specific permission?   snort 
 Enter object modes for group?    rwx 
 Enter object modes for others?    none  
 SAK - level should still be min:max 
 Enter command?      daemon_edit 
       add 
 Enter daemon name?     psql_unclass 
 Enter the command line for the daemon program?  pg_ctl 
 Enter the arguments for the program?  
start -D /var/postgresql/unclass_data -l 
/var/postgresql/unclass_data/logfile 
 Enter daemon environment setting?   <CR> 
 Start daemon at startup?    y 
 Is the daemon a High Integrity program file?   y 
 Will this daemon control a device?    n 
 Enter daemon security level and categories?  sl1 
 Enter daemon integrity level and categories?  il0 
 Use default daemon priority [-1] (strongly recommended) [Y] <CR> 
 Enter user name?     postgres 
 Enter group name?     postgres 
 Display current starting order before setting start index [N] <CR> 
 Enter daemon start index (CR for end of list) (1-7)  <CR> 
 Enter the delay interval in seconds before starting the daemon?  4 
 Enter the delay interval in seconds while stopping the daemon?  4 
 Enter daemon description?  start postgres at level 
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unclassified  
 ***REPEAT to create daemon to start postgresql at secret*** 
      add 
 Enter daemon name?    psql_secret 
 Enter the command line for the daemon program?  pg_ctl 
 Enter the arguments for the program?   
start -D /var/postgresql/secret_data -l 
/var/postgresql/secret_data/logfile 
 Enter daemon environment setting?   <CR> 
 Start daemon at startup?     y 
 Is the daemon a High Integrity program file?  y 
 Will this daemon control a device?    n 
 Enter daemon security level and categories?  sl5 sc1 
 Enter daemon integrity level and categories?  il0 
 Use default daemon priority [-1] (strongly recommended) [Y] <CR> 
 Enter user name?     postgres 
 Enter group name?     postgres 
 Display current starting order before setting start index [N] <CR> 
 Enter daemon start index (CR for end of list) (1-7) <CR> 
 Enter the delay interval in seconds before starting the daemon? 4 
 Enter the delay interval in seconds while stopping the daemon? 4 
 Enter daemon description?  Start postgres at level secret 
 exit 
 Start both daemons: 
 SAK 
 Enter command?     start_daemon 
 Enter daemon name?    psql_unclass 
 <Observe: Daemon psql_unclass started successfully> 
 Enter daemon name?    psql_secret 
 <Observe: Daemon psql_secret started successfully> 
NOTE: This is not a guarantee that the databases are running. To verify the 
 123
databases started properly, either remotely login with an available psql client or 
login locally. 
*Functional Test* 
Example: 
 Change security and integrity level to sl1:il0 
 SAK 
 run 
 psql -p 5433 -U postgres -d template1 
 <Observe: Welcome to psql, the PostgreSQL interactive terminal> 
*End Functional Test* 
4. Create the snort database 
 Log in to XTS as user snort 
 Change security and integrity level to sl1:il0 
 SAK 
 run 
 cd /var/postgresql/unclass_data 
 Run script createdb -p 5433 snort 
 <Observe: CREATE DATABASE> 
Run the schema update using create_postgresql from CD1 /snort-
2.8.0.1 
SAK 
<Change security and integrity level to max:max> 
SAK 
Enter command?  sda 
Enter device?  /dev/cdrom 
Enter new device security level and categories? sl1 
Enter new device integrity level and categories? il0 
Modify discretionary access [N] <CR> 
Is access correct [Y]  <CR> 
<Observe: Device access has been set. 
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SAK 
<Change security and integrity level to sl1:il0> 
SAK 
Enter command  reattach 
Enter family number? 1 
 cdtool cp /dev/cdrom /snort-2.8.0.1/create_postgresql 
./create_postgresql 
 psql -p 5433 < ./create_postgresql 
 Log out of untrusted environment 
 Change security and integrity level to sl5 sc1:il0 
 SAK 
 run 
 cd /var/postgresql/secret_data 
 run script createdb -p 5434 snort 
 <Observe: CREATE DATABASE> 
 run the schema update using create_postgresql from CD1 /snort-2.8.0.1 
SAK 
<Change security and integrity level to max:max> 
SAK 
Enter command?  sda 
Enter device?  /dev/cdrom 
Enter new device security level and categories? sl5 sc1 
Enter new device integrity level and categories? il0 
Modify discretionary access [N] <CR> 
Is access correct [Y]  <CR> 
<Observe: Device access has been set. 
SAK 
<Change security and integrity level to sl5 sc1:il0> 
SAK 
Enter command  reattach 
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 Enter family number? 2 
 cdtool cp /dev/cdrom /snort-2.8.0.1/create_postgresql 
./create_postgresql 
 psql -p 5434 < ./create_postgresql 
 Log out of untrusted environment 
 Reset CD-ROM back to min:oss 
SAK 
<change security and integrity level to max:max> 
SAK 
Enter command?  sda 
Enter device?  /dev/cdrom 
Enter new device security level and categories? min 
Enter new device integrity level and categories? oss 
Modify discretionary access [N] <CR> 
Is access correct [Y]  <CR> 
<Observe: Device access has been set. 
 Log out user snort from XTS400 
5. Perform functional test if the sensors are finished: 
 *Functional Test* 
 Login to PostgresSQL database from sensor IDS1 
 psql -h 192.168.100.130 -p 5433 -U snort -d snort  
 Run a query 
 select * from event; 
 Should get 0 rows. 
NOTE: If the output is access denied the database is not owned by snort 
 Login to PostgreSQL database from sensor IDS2 
 psql -h 192.168.101.130 -p 5434 -U snort -d snort 
 Run a query 
 select * from event; 
 Should get 0 rows. 
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NOTE: If the output is access denied the database is not owned by snort 
*End Functional Test* 
6. Return to Installing Debian snort sensor documentation and complete 
the steps starting from Step 6. Finalize Sensor Installation. 
E. INSTALLING BASE WEB APPLICATION ON STOP 6.3 
This section will cover integrating PHP4.3 with the existing httpd so the 
BASE web application functions with httpd. The MYSEA environment must 
already be installed for these procedures to work.  
NOTE: This will be a static install. See the INSTALL file in the php4 
directory 
NOTE: some components of php4 require pthread support. Pthreads was 
not implemented in STOP 6.3 but the pthread.h, libpthread.a and libpthread.so 
files still exist under /usr/include and /usr/lib respectively. Having these files in 
this location causes the configure process to crash on a check looking for 
pthread_cflags. Rename those files to pthread.h.old, libpthread.a.old and 
libpthread.so.old. 
NOTE: copying files from CD to the STOP 6.3 file system requires the use 
of the ‘cdtool’. An example of using the cdtool is: cdtool cp /dev/cdrom 
/postgres-7.4.18/postgresql-7.4.18.tar.gz 
/usr/local/src/postgresql-7.4.18.tar.gz 
For the XTS400 setup documentation all security and integrity levels are in 
bold Arial font and are given as security first then integrity: 
Example: sl0:il0 
Means security level 0 integrity level 0 
Example: min:oss 
Means: lowest possible security level with integrity level set to il3 with all 
categories enabled. 
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1. PHP 4.3.11 Installation 
 Perform the flex and bison install as admin <min:oss> 
 NOTE: php4 requires flex and suggests bison 
 Copy flex-2.5.4a-26.i386.rpm from CD1 /misc /usr/local/src 
cdtool cp /dev/cdrom /misc/flex-2.5.4a-26.i386.rpm 
/usr/local/src/flex-2.5.4a-26.i386.rpm 
 Copy bison-1.35-4.i386.rpm from CD1 /misc to /usr/local/src 
 cdtool cp /dev/cdrom /misc/bison-1.35-4.i386.rpm
 /usr/local/src/bison-1.35-4.i386.rpm 
 rpm -iv flex-2.5.4a-26.i386.rpm 
 rpm -iv bison-1.35-4.i386.rpm  
 Perform the php4 install as admin <min:il3> 
 Copy php-4.3.11.tar.tar from CD1 /php-4.3.11 to /usr/local/mysea 
 SAK 
 <Change security and integrity level to max:max> 
 SAK 
 Enter command?      sda 
 Enter device?      /dev/cdrom 
Enter new device security level and categories? min 
Enter new device integrity level and categories? il3 
Modify discretionary access [N] <CR> 
Is access correct [Y]  <CR> 
<Observe: Device access has been set. 
SAK 
<Change security and integrity level min:il3> 
SAK 
Enter command?  reattach 
Enter family number? 3 
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cdtool cp /dev/cdrom /php-4.3.11/php-4.3.11.tar.tar 
/usr/local/mysea 
 tar -xvzf php-4.3.11.tar.tar 
 mv php-4.3.11 php4 
cd php4 
 NOTE: this install will be without graphics support for BASE which 
is just the ability to make charts and graphs.  
cp php.ini-dist /home/http/conf/php.ini 
./configure --without-mysql --without-pear --with-
apache=/usr/local/mysea/apache --with-
pgsql=/usr/local/pgsql --with-config-file-
path=/home/http/conf  
 Edit the Makefile 
 Search for EXTRA_INCLUDES =  
 Add this line: -I/usr/local/mysea/include 
  NOTE: remember the Makefile statements are tab delimited 
(separators) 
 make 
 make install prefix=/usr/local/mysea 
 <Observe: 
  Installing PHP SAPI module: apache 
  Installing PHP CLI binary: /usr/local/mysea/bin 
  Installing PHP CLI man page: /usr/local/mysea/man/man1/ 
  Installing build environment: /usr/local/mysea/lib/php/build 
  Installing header files: /usr/local/mysea/include/php/ 
  Installing helper programs: /usr/local/mysea/bin 
   program: phpsize 
   program: php-config 
   program: phpextdist 
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2. Recompile Httpd to Include PHP Module 
 cd /usr/local/mysea/apache/src 
 Edit Configuration file 
 NOTE file attributes may need to be changed to rw for admin (chmod 
740 Configuration) 
 Page down to the end of the file 
 Add this line: AddModule modules/php4/libphp4.a 
 Save the file and recompile 
 ./Configure 
 make 
<Observe: there are no errors, just a warning about the use of mktemp, 
which can be ignored> 
<Expect: the size of httpd should now be approximately 5.8MB (5808437) 
in size. Verify with ls -l httpd> 
3. Httpd Installation 
Save the old httpd file under /usr/local/mysea/bin by renaming it or copy it 
off to a safe place and copy the new file into mysea/bin 
cp /usr/local/mysea/apache/src/httpd 
/usr/local/mysea/bin 
 cd /usr/local/mysea/bin 
 chmod 555 httpd 
 cd /home/http/conf 
 NOTE: might have to set write attribute on httpd.conf for admin 
  chmod 644 httpd.conf 
 Edit /home/http/conf/httpd.conf 
Add the following lines to the httpd.conf file or uncomment the lines if they 
exist:  
 AddType application/x-httpd-php .php 
AddType application/x-httpd-php-source .phps 
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 chmod 444 httpd.conf if you did chmod 644 httpd.conf 
4. Test PHP 
 *Functional Test* 
  mkdir /home/http/htdocs/ids_demo  
chmod 755 /home/http/htdocs/ids_demo 
  Create a test script called test.php in /home/http/htdocs/ids_demo 
  Add the following to the script: 
  <?php phpinfo();?> 
  Save the file and exit the untrusted environment 
  From a mysea workstation that has TCBE installed: 
  Start the TCBE 
  Click on SAR 
  Enter user name: mdemo1 
  Enter password: password 
  Click on SAR 
  Enter command: run 
  Open an Internet browser 
  In the URL address bar enter: 
http://192.168.0.130/ids_demo/test.php 
  <Observe: a PHP Version 4.3.11web page is generated> 
*End Functional Test* 
5. BASE Installation 
Since there are two IDS one unclassified and one secret there needs to be 
two BASE installs, one unclassified, and one secret. 
Copy base-1.4.0.tar.gz from CD1 /base-1.4.0 to /home/http/htdocs/ids_demo/ 
 cdtool cp /dev/cdrom /base-1.4.0/base-1.4.0.tar.gz 
/home/http/htdocs/ids_demo/base-1.4.0.tar.gz 
 Exit untrusted environment 
 Set security and integrity level min:il3 
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 SAK 
 Enter command?     fsm 
 ?        mkdir 
 Enter the directory to create?
 /home/http/htdocs/ids_demo/base_unclass 
 Should this be a deflection directory [N]  <CR> 
 <Observe: Directory created> 
 ?         change 
 Enter pathname?  
 /home/http/htdocs/ids_demo/base_unclass 
 Modify access level [N]   Y 
 Enter new object security level and categories?  sl1 
 Enter new object integrity level and categories? il0 
 Is the level correct [Y]      <CR> 
 Modify discretionary access [N]    <CR> 
 Display the object [N]      <CR> 
 Okay to change [Y]      <CR> 
 **REPEAT to make directory for base_secret 
 ?         mkdir 
 Enter the directory to create? 
/home/http/htdocs/ids_demo/base_secret 
 Should this be a deflection directory [N]    <CR> 
 <Observe: Directory created> 
 ?         change 
 Enter pathname?  /home/http/htdocs/ids_demo/base_secret 
 Modify access level [N]     Y 
 Enter new object security level and categories?  sl5 sc1 
 Enter new object integrity level and categories? il0 
 Is the level correct [Y]      <CR> 
 Modify discretionary access [N]    <CR> 
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 Display the object [N]      <CR> 
 Okay to change [Y]      <CR> 
 exit 
 Change security and integrity level sl1:il0 
 SAK 
 run 
 cd /home/http/htdocs/ids_demo 
 tar -C base_unclass -xvzf base-1.4.0.tar.gz 
 cd base_unclass/base-1.4.0 
 mv * /home/http/htdocs/ids_demo/base_unclass 
 chmod 777 /home/http/htdocs/ids_demo/base_unclass  
NOTE the setup performed in step 7 requires rwx access. Will 
change back later 
 Exit the untrusted environment  
 Change security and integrity level sl5 sc1:il0 
 SAK 
 run 
 cd /home/http/htdocs/ids_demo 
 tar -C base_secret -xvzf base-1.4.0.tar.gz 
 cd base_secret/base-1.4.0 
 mv * /home/http/htdocs/ids_demo/base_secret 
 chmod 777 /home/http/htdocs/ids_demo/base_secret   
NOTE the setup performed in step 8 requires rwx access to write 
the base_conf.php file. Will change back later 
 exit untrusted environment  
 Change security and integrity level min:il3 
 SAK 
 run 
 copy adodb498.gz from CD1 /base-1.4.0 to /usr/local/mysea 
 cdtool cp /dev/cdrom /base-1.4.0/adodb498.gz 
/usr/local/mysea/adodb498.gz 
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 cd /usr/local/mysea 
 tar -xvzf adodb498.gz 
<Observe: adodb directory is created. There is nothing to install but the 
scripts running in base_unclass and base_secret will need access to 
these files> 
6. Unclassified BASE Website Installation 
 Start a session on a MYSEA client at SIM_UNCLASSIFIED 
 Using Internet Explorer enter this address into the URL address bar: 
http://192.168.0.130/ids_demo/base_unclass/setup/index.php 
NOTE: if you get access denied check the directory attributes and 
chmod to 777 for now 
 Click on continue hyperlink 
 Step 1 of 5 
  Path to ADODB: /usr/local/mysea/adodb 
  Click on Submit Query button 
 Step 2 of 5 
  Pick a Database type: PostGRES 
  Database Name: snort 
  Database Host: leave blank 
  Database port: 5433 
  Database user name: snort 
  Database password: mysea 
  Skip the Use Archive Database settings 
  Click on Submit Query button 
 Step 3 of 5 
  Click the box next to Use Authentication System  
  Admin User name: snort   
NOTE: you can use any name you want 
  Password: mysea 
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  Full Name: snort 
 Step 4 of 5 
  Click on Create BASE AG button 
  Click on 'Now continue to step 5... hyperlink (middle page) 
 Login with user and password created in step 3 of 5 
 When you come back to this site, the main page is base_main.php 
http://192.168.0.130/ids_demo/base_unclass/base_main.php 
 NOTE: don't forget to chmod 755 base_unclass 
 Cosmetic changes:  
cd /home/http/htdocs/ids_demo/base_unclass/languages 
 Edit english.lang.php 
 Search for _TITLE 
 Add the word UNCLASS before and after the title in single quotes 
 bug_fix: minor 
When logging out: Fatal error: call to function base_header() in 
/.../base_logout.php on line 23 
 FIX: change base_header to header 
7. Secret BASE Website Installation 
 Start a session on a MYSEA client at SIM_SECRET 
 Using Internet Explorer, enter this address into the URL address bar: 
 http://192.168.0.130/ids_demo/base_secret/setup/index.php 
NOTE: if you get access denied check the directory attributes and 
chmod to 777 for now 
 Click on continue 
 Step 1 of 5 
  Path to ADODB: /usr/local/mysea/adodb 
  Click on Submit Query button 
 Step 2 of 5 
  Pick a Database type: PostGRES 
  Database Name: snort 
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  Database Host: leave blank 
  Database port: 5434 
  Database user name: snort 
  Database password: leave blank 
  Skip the Use Archive Database settings 
  Click on Submit Query 
 Step 3 of 5 
  Click the box next to Use Authentication System  
  Admin User name: snort   
NOTE: you can use any name you want 
  Password: mysea 
  Full Name: snort 
 Step 4 of 5 
  Click on Create BASE AG button 
  Click on 'Now continue to step 5... hyperlink (middle page)   
 Login with user and password created in step 3 of 5 
 To return to this web site use the main page: base_main.php 
http://192.168.0.130/ids_demo/base_secret/base_main.php 
 NOTE: don't forget to chmod 755 base_secret  
 Cosmetic change: 
cd /home/http/htdocs/ids_demo/base_secret/languages 
 Edit english.lang.php 
 Search for _TITLE 
 Add the word SECRET before and after the title in single quotes 
 bug_fix: minor 
When logging out: Fatal error: call to function base_header() in 
/.../base_logout.php on line 23 
 FIX: change base_header to header 
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APPENDIX C FUNCTIONAL TEST PLAN 
This section covers a functional test of the IDS architecture for the Linux 
Red Hat 8 environment and the XTS400 environment. The purpose of this 
functional test is to test all of the IDS components as one functional unit. When 
the alert mechanism on the IDS sensor is triggered data should move from the 
IDS sensor via the PostgreSQL client to the PostgreSQL database. Data should 
then be available for display using the BASE web application. The alert 
mechanism will be triggered using an IDS false positive test generator called 
‘IDSWakeup’.  
IDS Wakeup sends several packets to a destination IP address with each 
packet containing data that is interpreted as malicious data. Numerous unique 
alerts are generated depending on the rule sets enabled on the sensor.  
A. PRELIMINARY SETUP FOR FUNCTIONAL TESTING 
1. IDSWakeup Installation 
1. Build or clone another Debian 4.0 machine and name it Attacker. If the 
choice is to build a new machine use the Installing Snort on Debian 4.0 
instructions from Appendix A. Perform the installation except for installing 
snort, snort rules, and lokkit. 
2. Copy the three files to any directory. Change to that directory and install 
all three packages in the following order 
dpkg -i hping2_2.rc3-4_i386.deb 
dpkg -i libnet0_1.0.2a-7_i386.deb 
dpkg -i idswakeup_1.0.4_i386.deb 
 If the Attacker and IDS sensors are on VMWare and the VMWare 
machines are using bridged networking on one physical network port, both IDS 
will see the traffic. If the physical machine has two network ports use separate 
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bridges for each IDS sensor. Remember to switch the bridge on the Attacker 
when switching from unclass network to secret network. 
B. RED HAT 8 IDS ARCHITECTURE FUNCTIONAL TEST 
1. Before starting IDSWakeup verify database and web site components 
are available. 
2. Edit the Snort configuration file /etc/snort/snort.conf on IDS1 and IDS2 
to send alerts to the PostgreSQL database on the Red Hat 8 Linux 
system. 
Settings for IDS1: 
output database: log, postgresql, user=snort 
dbname=snort password=mysea host=192.168.100.3 
port=5433 
Settings for IDS2: 
output datagase: log, postgresql, user=snort 
dbname=snort password=mysea host=192.168.101.3 
port=5434  
3. Stop any running snort processes on each IDS: 
ps aux | grep snort 
kill <pid number> 
 These tests will run Snort without using the daemon mode. This will 
allow for collecting statistics that will be used to compare with the statistics 
viewed on the BASE web site. Start the Snort process on each IDS sensor 
snort -u snort -g snort -c /etc/snort/snort.conf &> 
ids1_test1.txt 
snort -u snort -g snort -c /etc/snort/snort.conf &> 
ids2_test1.txt 
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NOTE: All of the output (stdout and stderr) will be piped to the text files 
and hold the command prompt. To view the text files to verify Snort properly 
initialized switch to another virtual console (Alt+F2) and search the test file for 
‘Initialization Complete’ 
4. From the workstation that can access the RH8 web server, open IE or 
Firefox and browse to the secret BASE web site. Record the Total Number 
of Alerts on the home page or clear all alerts. 
5. Switch to the Unclass BASE website and Record the Total Number of 
Alerts on the home page or clear all alerts. 
NOTE: To clear alerts: 
Click on the number next to the Total Number of Alerts: 
Click on the drop down arrow next to {action} and select Delete alerts 
Click on Entire Query button 
6. Switch to the Attacker machine and start IDSWakeup 
Verify Attacker machine is configured for unclassified network with 
respect to bridge (VMWARE) and IP address. 
Set the IP address to 192.168.100.50 
 ifconfig eth0 192.168.100.50 
 idswakeup <source IP> <destination IP> 
 idswakeup 192.168.100.50 192.168.100.3 
The goal is to attack the RH8 server not the IDS itself to verify the 
IDS is reading the traffic. 
Test will take about 1 to 2 minutes to run. 
7. Refresh the browser; verify that alerts are being recorded. When the 
IDSWakeup test completes, record the Total Number of Alerts observed 
on the BASE home page to the table below. 
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Table for recording results: 
Total # Alerts Unique Alerts TCP% UDP% ICMP% Portscan Traffic % 
      
 
8. On IDS1 do a crtl+z then kill %<pid> to stop the Snort process. Open 
the file ids1_test1.txt and search for ‘Action Stats’. Verify that the entries 
under Action Stats match the number of Total Number Alerts recorded 
from step 7 
 Action Stats: 
 Alerts: 
 Logged: 
One other stat to check is dropped packets. Search for ‘Packet 
Wire Totals’ and look for ‘Dropped’. Count should be zero. 
9. Switch to the secret BASE web site. If the traffic is properly segregated 
then the Total Number of Alerts count should have remained the same. 
10. Reconfigure the Attacker box to operate on the secret network. 
Reconfigure the bridge (VMWare) and IP address 
ifconfig eth0 192.168.101.50 
11. Restart the Snort process on IDS1 but do not pipe the output to a text 
file.  Repeat the IDSWakeup test 
snort -u snort -g snort  -c /etc/snort/snort.conf 
idswakeup 192.168.101.50 192.168.101.3 
12. Refresh the browser; verify that alerts are being recorded. When 
IDSWakeup is finished recorded the Total Number of Alerts observed in 
the table below. 
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Table for recording results: 
Total # Alerts Unique Alerts TCP% UDP% ICMP% Portscan Traffic % 
      
 
13. On IDS2 do a  crtl+z kill %<pid> to stop the Snort process. Open the 
file ids2_test1.txt and search for ‘Action Stats’. Verify that the entries 
under Action Stats match the number of Total Number Alerts recorded 
from step 13 
 Action Stats: 
 Alerts: 
 Logged: 
One other stat to check is dropped packets. Search for ‘Packet 
Wire Totals’ and look for ‘Dropped’. Count should be zero. 
14. Switch to the unclassified BASE web site. If the traffic is properly 
segregated then the Total Number of Alerts count should have remained 
the same. 
C. XTS400 IDS ARCHITECTURE FUNCTIONAL TEST 
1. Verify database and web site components in the XTS400 environment 
are running. Edit the Snort configuration file /etc/snort/snort.conf on IDS1 
and IDS2 to send alerts to the PostgreSQL database on the XTS400 
system. 
Settings for IDS1: 
output database: log, postgresql, user=snort 
dbname=snort password=mysea host=192.168.100.130 
port=5433 
Settings for IDS2: 
output datagase: log, postgresql, user=snort 
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dbname=snort password=mysea host=192.168.101.130 
port=5434  
2. Stop any running Snort processes on each IDS.  
Start the Snort process on each IDS. 
snort -u snort -g snort -c /etc/snort/snort.conf &> 
ids1_test2.txt 
snort -u snort -g snort -c /etc/snort/snort.conf &> 
ids2_test2.txt 
NOTE: All of the output (stdout and stderr) will be piped to the text files 
and hold the command prompt. To view the text files to verify Snort 
properly initialized switch to another virtual console (Alt+F2) and search 
the test file for ‘Initialization Complete’ 
3. From the workstation start the TCBE and then start a 
SIM_UNCLASSIFIED session as user mdemo1. 
4. Open the unclassified BASE web site and record the Total Number of 
Alerts on the home page or clear all alerts. Close the web browser. 
5. Change to a SIM_SECRET session and open the secret BASE web 
site. 
6. The Attacker machine should still be configured for the secret network. 
Rerun the idswakeup test. 
idswakeup 192.168.101.50 192.168.101.130 
7. Refresh the browser; verify that alerts are being recorded. When the 
IDSWakeup test completes, record the Total Number of Alerts observed 
from the secret BASE home page to the table below. 
 
 
 
 143
Table for recording results: 
Total # Alerts Unique Alerts TCP% UDP% ICMP% Portscan Traffic % 
      
 
8.  On IDS2 do a  crtl+z kill %<pid> to stop the Snort process. Open the 
file ids2_test2.txt and search for ‘Action Stats’. Verify that the entries 
under Action Stats match the number of Total Number Alerts recorded 
from step 8 
 Action Stats: 
 Alerts: 
 Logged: 
One other stat to check is dropped packets. Search for ‘Packet 
Wire Totals’ and look for ‘Dropped’. Count should be zero. 
9. Close the browser. 
10. Change to SIM_UNCLASSIFIED session then open the unclassified 
BASE web site. If the sensors are properly segregated then the Total 
Number of Alerts count should have remained the same. 
11. Reconfigure the Attacker machine to operate on the unclassified 
network. 
If using VMWare reconfigure the bridge 
ifconfig eth0 192.168.100.50 
12. Restart the Snort process on IDS2 but do not pipe the output to a file. 
Rerun the idswakeup test. 
snort -u snort -g snort -c /etc/snort/snort.conf 
idswakeup 192.168.100.50 192.168.100.130 
13. Refresh the browser; verify that alerts are being recorded. When the 
IDSWakeup test completes, record the Total Number of Alerts observed 
from the unclassified BASE home page to the table below. 
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Table for recording results: 
Total # Alerts Unique Alerts TCP% UDP% ICMP% Portscan Traffic % 
      
 
14. On IDS1 do a  crtl+z kill%<pid> to stop the Snort process. Open the 
file ids1_test2.txt and search for ‘Action Stats’. Verify that the entries 
under Action Stats match the number of Total Number Alerts recorded 
from step 14 
 Action Stats: 
 Alerts: 
 Logged: 
One other stat to check is dropped packets. Search for ‘Packet 
Wire Totals’ and look for ‘Dropped’. Count should be zero. 
This completes the testing of both the Red Hat 8 and XTS400 
environments. Stop all Snort processes and log out of all sessions. 
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